An Analysis of the Defense Acquisition Strategy for Unmanned Systems by Jones, Courtney David
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2013-11-01
An Analysis of the Defense Acquisition
Strategy for Unmanned Systems
Jones, Courtney David
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/54612
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.









An Analysis of the Defense Acquisition Strategy for Unmanned 
Systems 
20 November 2013 
Maj Courtney David Jones, USMC 
Thesis Advisors:  Dr. Nicholas Dew, Associate Professor and 
William R. Fast, Senior Lecturer  
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 





The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - i - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Abstract 
In the past 12 years of sustained conflict, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has procured thousands of unmanned systems, from ordnance disposal robots to 
airborne surveillance platforms to unmanned cargo helicopters.  These assets have 
saved countless lives and have become critical to DoD strategy.  The health of the 
U.S. robotics industry must become a national strategic imperative in order to 
maintain technology dominance.   
The cyclical nature of DoD funding inevitably results in industry expansion 
and consolidation.  The unmanned systems industry will be subject to consolidation 
pressures.  Keeping unmanned system cost-per-copy low is critical; thus, economies 
of scale should be highly valued.  However, premature robotics industry 
consolidation could threaten innovation and competition that will be critical for the 
U.S. military to maintain its dominance.    
With impending budget reductions, there will be increasing pressure to narrow 
down on robotics technologies to achieve efficiencies and reduce costs.  However, 
to maintain the health of the robotics industry, the acquisition strategy must be 
contingent on the evolution of industry.  This thesis examines the defense robotics 
industry and historical technology S-curves for comparable industries and evaluates 
unmanned system acquisition strategies. 
Keywords: Learning Curve, Competition, Unmanned, Robotics, UAS, 
Acquisition, Consolidation 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past 12 years of conflict have resulted in amazing breakthroughs in the 
way that the Department of Defense (DoD) envisions the role of unmanned systems.  
Several factors have led to this dramatic increase in interest in unmanned systems, 
chief among them the evolving nature of unconventional warfare and the increasing 
focus on casualty avoidance.  The wars in the Middle East have been a boon for the 
U.S. robotics industry, which has benefitted from yearly increases in DoD research 
and development (R&D) spending.  The common refrain, “the last fighter pilot has 
already been born,” carries a lot of weight for the robotics industry, which has moved 
to the forefront of strategic initiatives.   
The proliferation of unmanned systems on the battlefield has not been without 
issue.  In the haste to field game-changing new technologies, the DoD has 
distributed a lot of money among many companies to field the most advanced 
equipment.  Some argue that money has been wasted developing technologies that 
other companies figured out but would not share due to proprietary constraints 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006). This has led to much scrutiny of 
the acquisitions process, where increasing focus on cost savings and avoidance will 
put pressure on decision-makers to narrow down quickly on proven technologies in 
order to achieve efficiencies.  If this narrowing down on technologies occurs before 
technological maturity, the DoD runs the risk of losing technological dominance in 
the battlespace and could face even greater costs in upgrading and retrofitting 
outdated technologies. 
Steele (1989) noted that in corporate firms, strategic management is often in 
conflict with operations management.  He stated that survival depends on balancing 
the tension between current operational fiscal needs and the need to fund research 
and development to maintain technological dominance.  He also noted the twin 
demons of technology management: cost effectiveness and certainty of performance 
(Steele, 1989).  Certainty of performance is of even greater importance in military 
applications.  Although an important characteristic of unmanned systems is relative 
expendability, the DoD should explore all reasonable measures to ensure certainty 
of performance, to make sure as many unmanned systems return to base as 
possible. 
Tsipis and Janeway (1984) discussed a quandary in which procurement 
specialists often find themselves.  At the time, they noted, the U.S. was in the 
process of purchasing 7,000 M1 tanks at a cost of $20 billion, but many argued that 
the U.S. should focus on building 20,000 cheaper tanks.  However, the second 
choice would require additional crews to man and maintain the tanks, driving up 
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manpower costs.  Currently, the manpower requirement is sometimes greater for 
unmanned systems than for manned systems, given the infancy of autonomy 
technology.  However, the defense roadmaps envision a future where autonomous 
control and more efficient systems greatly reduce manpower requirements.   
The increased DoD focus on energy efficiency also bodes well for unmanned 
systems proliferation.  Studies have shown that not only are unmanned aviation 
systems cheaper per copy than manned systems that perform similar missions, the 
unmanned systems also burn a fraction of the fuel (Null, 2010).   
After almost 100 years of evolution in the fixed-wing aviation industry, the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the epitome of the desires for economies of scale, but 
it is the only major program of its kind in production at his moment.  While the JSF 
was designed to be the most versatile multi-role fighter/attack aircraft yet, one has to 
wonder how much innovation and competition has been sacrificed in an attempt to 
gain economies of scale.  Initially the program promised unprecedented 
commonality between the versions produced for each service, but that has not been 
the case.  Cost overrun has been another major problem with the JSF and other 
platforms.  The rush to low-rate production prior to technology maturation has 
resulted in millions of dollars spent in retrofit (GAO, 2012). 
This report draws a distinction between exploration and exploitation.  
According to Benner and Tushman (2002), “exploitative innovations involve 
improvements in existing components and build on the existing technological 
trajectory, whereas exploratory innovation involves a shift to a different technological 
trajectory” (p. 679).  Exploration determines the bounds of technology and 
determines which trajectory to take.  Exploitation refers to taking the superior 
technology and maximizing it, achieving efficiencies and incremental improvements 
that make the technology better and hopefully cheaper to produce.  The terms 
exploration and exploitation are used throughout the report. 
Budget data for unmanned systems through 2018 seem to indicate the DoD is 
trending toward exploitation, rather than further exploration (IHS Aeorospace, 
Defense, & Maritime, 2013).  Although labeled a strategic priority, unmanned 
systems R&D and procurement budgets are relatively flat or in decline.  The industry 
is as healthy now as at any point in history, with around 40 companies receiving 
funds for unmanned system development.  Attempts to achieve efficiencies could 
irreparably harm the U.S. unmanned systems industry and result in a loss of 
competition and innovation critical to maintaining dominance. 
There will be intense pressure for defense robotics industry consolidation as 
fiscal pressures mount in the coming years.  However, attempting to compress the 
time frame between exploration and exploitation may lead the DoD into long-term 
procurement contracts for technologically inferior products.  The defense acquisition 
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strategy for unmanned systems procurement must balance short-term cost 
avoidance pressures with the need for investment in long-term technological 
advantage.  
A. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare unmanned systems technology 
evolution and acquisition strategies to historical examples to develop a framework 
that supports future acquisition policy. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What are the evolutionary similarities between the unmanned systems 
industry and early aviation and information technology (IT) industries? 
 How is DoD funding distributed across firms in the U.S. robotics 
industry?  
 Does the DoD procurement strategy for unmanned systems promote 
industry innovation and competition? 
 Does the proposed defense budget demonstrate the importance 
placed on unmanned systems industry development?  
C. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research attempts to place unmanned systems evolution in the context 
of other technological evolutions to help defense leaders develop a strategy that 
promotes competition and innovation in the unmanned systems industry.   
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research does not cover classified unmanned systems application and, 
therefore, cannot present findings on many of the technological advances underway 
in the robotics industry. 
The difficulty in forecasting and assessing technological breakthroughs also 
limits the comparative analysis of technology S-curves.  While it is easy to assess 
the impact of historical technological breakthroughs, the impact of future 
breakthroughs is limited only by the imagination and cannot be accurately weighted 
in the context of historical precedent. 
E. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
This research consists of a comparative analysis of the present unmanned 
systems industry with historical industry examples to identify similarities in the 
evolution of innovation.  Using historical analysis, this report develops a framework 
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for comparison dealing with industry evolution and the effects of government policies 
on innovation. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
In the first section of this research report, Chapter II examines the evolution of 
technology in various industries to provide a framework for comparison.  Chapter III 
discusses the methodology used for the comparative analysis between the 
industries.  The next section, Chapter IV, examines the current state of the 
unmanned systems industry in the U.S.  Chapter V presents a comparative analysis 
of the unmanned systems industry with the industries discussed in Chapter II.  
Chapter VI presents a comparison of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (OSD, 2013) with future budget 
information to draw conclusions.  The last section analyzes the DoD’s unmanned 
systems acquisition strategy and recommends policies to maintain innovation and 
competition in the unmanned systems industry.  
G. SUMMARY 
Unmanned systems provide a cost-effective way to protect national security 
and U.S. service member lives.  The DoD has opened up a world of possibilities with 
unmanned systems and must carefully manage the nation’s resources to maintain 
technological dominance on the battlefield and around the globe.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the first part of this literature review, I attempt to establish a context for the 
evaluation of technology in order to draw parallels between the unmanned systems 
industry and historical industries.  I examine common methods of estimating 
technology maturity, including technology S-curves and industrial systems evolution. 
In the second part of this literature review, I focus on historical examples of 
technological evolution in the fixed-wing aviation and information technology 
industries.  This report details the role of government research, development, 
technology, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement in the development of new 
technology. 
B. CHARTING THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
1. Technology S-Curves 
To establish the context between evolutionary trends in technology, one must 
construct a framework for comparison. The framework can take many different forms 
but is most commonly associated with a learning curve, or technology S-curve 
(sigmoid curve), due to its shape.  Because most relevant literature approaches 
technological evolution from the standpoint of a company, in this analysis the firm 
refers to the DoD or individual service component, depending on who evaluates the 
unmanned system technology. 
The S-curve is depicted in numerous ways, but the most common depiction 
features product performance metrics in the y-axis and a time or effort component in 
the x-axis, as seen in Figure 1.  The metric assigned to the y-axis is extremely 
important in objectively evaluating performance over a time period.   
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Figure 1. Technology S-Curve  
(Christensen, 1999) 
Researchers have described different facets of innovation in many ways.  
One dichotomy salient to this discussion is component versus architectural 
innovation.  Christensen (1999) described architectural innovation as a change in 
the design or system of components, as opposed to a change in a component that 
makes up the system.  Both component and architectural innovations follow S-curve 
patterns.  In many industries, architectural innovations lead to the most dramatic 
upheavals in innovation, with Christensen (1992) noting that next-generation 
architectural innovation is often inferior to the existing generation at first, which may 
make it initially seem like a poor strategic choice Figure 2 shows the overlap 
between generations of architectural innovation.  Christensen (1992) noted that 
entrant firms, not dominant firms, are often responsible for major architectural 
innovations. 
 
Figure 2. Multiple Technology S-Curves  
(Christensen, 1999) 
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Christensen (1999) specified two strategies available to the firm when a 
technology approaches what appears to be the top of the S-curve.  The firm can 
choose to switch to a new, more promising technology that has created a new S-
curve in the diagram (as seen in Figure 2).  The firm can also choose to stretch the 
life of the current technology by exploring ways to improve product components.  
The choice to switch or stretch is a strategic decision with many implications for the 
firm.   
As Christensen (1999) noted, the chief drawback of using the technology S-
curve to evaluate current technology is assuming the curve is leveling out near the 
top (technology maturation) when it is not.  A firm might actually retard the further 
development of technology if it errs in its estimates and pursues counterproductive 
resource allocation by switching S-curves.  Likewise, failure to correctly identify 
technological maturity may result in retaining the increasingly obsolete technology 
too long.  Failure to adopt a strategy for switching technologies can result in the loss 
of technological dominance by a leading firm. 
Christensen (1999) provided four recommendations for using S-curves to 
determine what strategy to pursue.  First, benchmarking competitors’ performance 
can provide a clear picture of technological maturity.  The universality of 
performance metrics is critical to benchmarking.  Second, Christensen accurately 
observed that technology maturation could be the result of a new innovation, rather 
than the cause of it.  The launch of a revolutionary new technology could drive 
development away from a current technology.  Third, the component level offers 
many alternatives to switching S-curves, including stretching or improvements to 
system architecture.  Fourth, identifying the need to switch S-curves is most critical 
at the architectural level, but it may be the more difficult analysis, since emergent 
architectural innovations are often less capable than the existing technology and 
may appear to be inferior (Christensen, 1992).  
Christensen (1999) also drew parallels between the maturity of the nascent 
architectural technology and the speed with which it supplanted the old architecture, 
arguing that the more mature the nascent technology when it emerged, the quicker it 
replaced the old technology.  He pointed to disk drive technology in the computer 
industry as evidence, stating that new architectural technology accounted for over 
50% market share within two years of introduction, and the old technology had 
almost disappeared in four years.  While this observation is solely related to disk 
drive technology in the 1990s, the trend is similar, if not accelerated, in many other 
technological fields.  Dussauge, Hart, and Ramanantsoa (1992) described this 
phenomenon, pointing to the “snowball” (p. 19) effect of combinations of 
technologies that reduce “the delay between invention and commercialization by 
internalization of the R&D process” (p. 19). 
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The consequences for failing to recognize and switch to an emerging, 
dominant technology can be dire.  As Mui (2012) noted, although Kodak invented 
digital photography technology, it failed to recognize it as a disruptive technology 
and focused its resources on film.  As a result, the Kodak Company is today a shell 
of its former self.  This is an example of the Schumpeterian model of creative 
destruction: A new technology appears that eventually destroys the old technology.  
However, it may take time for the complete obsolescence of the old technology to 
occur.  As noted by Utterback (1996) in his discussion of the gas lamp industry in the 
late 1800s, the new technology may even spur the old technology to new heights as 
competition between the rival technologies increases.  Early electric lamps, 
pioneered of course by Thomas Edison, immediately competed with entrenched gas 
lamps.  The quality of the light from the earliest electric lamps, however, could not 
rival gas lamps, and the appearance of the electric light spurred the gas lamp 
industry to important innovations that improved efficiencies and lowered costs in the 
gas lamp industry (Utterback, 1996). 
Another depiction of technological innovation (Dussauge et al., 1992) could 
be its effect on unit cost.  In this case, a learning or experience curve is depicted in a 
diagram with time or effort on the x-axis and unit cost on the y-axis (Figure 3).  
Innovation would then be depicted as a curve where unit cost declines as time or 
effort increases, due to developments that bring down the cost of the product.  As 
seen in the technology S-curve, the innovation curves overlap, signifying the higher 
unit cost of new technological developments compared to the existing technology.  If 
the firm continues production of the old technology, eventually the firm is unable to 
bring unit cost down any further.  A switch to the nascent technology might incur 
higher costs, but the potential of the technology exceeds the risk of switching.  In this 
case, the firm has to choose between exploiting efficiencies with the current 
technology and switching to a new technology that might achieve considerably 
greater cost savings in the long run.  
 
Figure 3. Innovation Curves and Unit Cost  
(Dussauge et al., 1992) 
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The drawback to S-curves is that they are much easier to depict once the 
technological maturation is well in the past.  Forecasting is the most difficult part of 
assessing technological capability.  Technological forecasters can hazard a guess at 
a future capability but can never adequately explain how this capability can be 
achieved (Dussauge et al., 1992).  This emphasizes the importance of meaningful 
metrics to assess advancement.  For example, Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965) is a 
famous estimate of hard drive storage capacity capabilities.  It uses bytes per 
specified area of disk space as a metric for storage.  Moore was able to forecast 
technological capabilities with surprising accuracy but never specified how it was to 
be accomplished.  Until a new data storage medium is constructed, this will continue 
to be the metric used to assess data storage capability.  Dussauge et al. (1992) 
pointed to the fact that while the amount of data per specified area has increased by 
one rate, the cost of storing a single unit of information has decreased by a different 
rate, which further compounds the problem of accurate forecasting.  The single 
biggest impediment to accurate forecasting is the unforeseen technological 
discontinuity that creates a new S-curve and brings the previous one to an abrupt 
end as other firms seek first-mover advantage (Dussauge et al., 1992). 
Perhaps the best approach to forecasting is summed up by Dussauge et al. 
(1992): 
Indeed, what is important in anticipating technological changes is less 
identifying the paths that are probable than preparing for less 
predictable radical changes that may totally upset the bases of 
competition and create the most significant threats or opportunities for 
the firm. (p. 73) 
A firm’s acquisition strategy must be as ready for what cannot be known as it is for 
what it assumes will occur.  One of the most difficult challenges a firm must face is 
deciding what resources it must commit to address what it cannot yet visualize. 
Dussauge et al. (1992) also advised that before a firm can make a decision to 
switch technologies, the firm must know what technological capabilities it possesses.  
This technological audit can greatly assist a firm in evaluating its portfolio, critical to 
planning for future decision-making.  The problem is that it is difficult to place a dollar 
value on technological capability or the pursuit of it.  Balance sheets clearly state the 
amount of R&D spent over a year, but this figure alone is insufficient in assessing a 
firm’s technological capability. 
With the emergence of a technological discontinuity, an organization must 
categorize it to develop the appropriate response.  Utterback (1996) provided three 
questions to evaluate the discontinuity.  First, does the discontinuity pertain to an 
assembled or a non-assembled product?  For example, in the unmanned systems 
industry, does a discontinuity pertain to a radically new vehicular design, or does it 
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pertain only to a component of an existing vehicle, like an onboard sensor?  Second, 
does the discontinuity represent a substitution of an existing product, or does it 
define a brand-new market?  Last, for the established industry firms, is the 
discontinuity competence enhancing or competence destroying (Utterback, 1996)?  
2. Industrial System Evolution 
Duysters (1996) proposed a series of hypotheses to evaluate industrial 
system evolution, which is also useful in examining the U.S. robotics industry.  The 
first hypothesis deals with conditions of market and technological uncertainty.  In this 
phase, new technologies are funded by academia and government institutions.  
Programs like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) explore 
the boundaries of emergent technology, serving as an incubator.  Duysters’ second 
hypothesis deals with early movers who attempt to use technological innovations in 
an offensive strategy.  Duysters referred to these companies as “opinion leaders” (p. 
24) whose early offerings shape the dynamics of the emerging technology.  The 
death rate of companies trying to prove their product is highest during this phase, as 
the emergent technology is shaped into something commercially desirable, lest it fall 
by the wayside. 
Duysters’ (1996) third hypothesis detailed the emergence of the basic design, 
decreasing technological uncertainty in the innovation and bringing more companies 
into the market.  During this phase, incremental improvements to the technology 
increase rapidly as firms attempt to gain a competitive advantage through 
differentiation, cost, or some other metric.  Often, the larger firms with greater 
economies of scale enter the market at this time, which begins to put pressure on 
smaller firms.  Dussauge et al. (1992) noted that industries where technology is of 
greater importance display greater potential for economies of scale as firms are 
pressured to achieve sales volume.  To achieve and maintain competitive 
advantage, especially in the defense industry, firms seek long-run contracts and high 
product volume.  The experience effect is much more important in this case 
(Dussauge et al., 1992).  In Duysters’ (1996) fourth hypothesis, these larger firms 
outcompete the smaller firms as prices decrease and more customers enter the 
marketplace.  Competition between firms usually leads to standardization of the 
product.  Brittain and Freeman (1980) noted that during this phase technological 
innovation is usually supplanted by process innovation as firms attempt to achieve 
efficiencies.  
Duysters’ (1992) fifth hypothesis detailed the decline of technological 
innovation as industry carrying capacity is reached and efficiency becomes the most 
important competitive weapon.  This situation leads to Duysters’ sixth hypothesis, 
where the decreased profit margins drive out all but the most efficient companies 
with one exception.  The mass market creates niches that allow specialist 
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organizations to creep in.  During this phase, dominant industries usually must 
increase R&D spending to stretch the limits of the current technology.  Often, these 
specialist firms are able to create competence-destroying innovations that 
undermine the dominant firms, who find themselves unable to shift technologies due 
to inertia.  In Duysters’ seventh and final hypothesis, this competence-destroying 
innovation leads to a shift in the technological paradigm, leading to a renewal of the 
evolutionary cycle (Duysters, 1996).  This review of Duysters’ hypotheses is relevant 
in the discussion of the unmanned systems industry. 
3. Dominant Design  
In almost all S-curve evolutionary periods, a dominant design eventually 
emerges.  Argyres, Bigelow, and Nickerson (2011) described dominant design as “a 
new design that combines product elements in a novel way that immediately sparks 
a surge in unanticipated demand for that product” (p. 3).  The key to this description 
is the word demand, which implies that the product is desired by the marketplace, so 
much so that competing products must scramble to adapt.  There are several 
strategic responses to a dominant design, including imitation or exit.   
Once a dominant design has been established, the technology S-curve might 
begin to shallow out, as incremental innovation seeks to improve the design.  
Utterback (1996) warned that “incremental innovation … is a wise path of least 
resistance for the established firm, but sustained success in this form of innovation 
forms a trap for management” (p. 225).  He stated, “When radical innovation is 
plausible, … constant incremental innovation can create myopia in the ranks of top 
management” (p. 225).   
Utterback (1996) conducted a study of technological innovation in 41 
industries and described three characteristics of an innovation.  The first 
characteristic pertains to an assembled product, not an individual component.  The 
second characteristic is that the new innovation expands demand in the industry.  
The third characteristic is that the product destroys the competency of existing 
competitors, thus shifting the technology S-curve.  The findings are displayed in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Sources of Breakthrough Innovation  
(Birkler et al., 2003) 
According to Utterback’s (1996) research, non-prime participants 
overwhelmingly supplied the breakthrough innovations that shifted industry S-
curves.  Utterback’s research shows the importance of maintaining a healthy 
industrial base that is capable of dynamic innovation.  This entails maintaining the 
capability to recognize, foster, and exploit technological innovations from outside the 
prime contractor base.  Utterback and Murray (1977) also acknowledged the greater 
incentive for small firms to innovate, since initial sales of a new product affect the 
company to a greater extent than they would a large firm.  
4. User-Driven Innovation 
Determining what drives innovation is another useful starting point for 
discussion.  Von Hippel (2005) defined lead user as follows: 
1. [Lead users] are at the leading edge of an important market trend, 
and so are currently experiencing needs that will later be 
experienced by many users in that market, and 
2. [Lead users] anticipate relatively high benefits from obtaining a 
solution to their needs, and so may innovate. (p. 22) 
Von Hippel (2005) stated that most product innovations come from those with lead 
user characteristics.  His theory is based on the assumption that a lead user’s 
innovation was useful to him or her, so it must then be useful to many.  This theory 
has important applications to the discussion of procurement time frames.  The DoD 
procurement time frame is notoriously long, often with years in between technology 
demonstrations and actual fielding of equipment.  A greatly accelerated procurement 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 13 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
process could result in an end product more closely aligned with a warfighter’s 
needs. 
5. How Does the Government Assess Technology Maturity? 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
(ASD[R&E]) publishes a Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) guidebook to 
assist in the classification of technological maturity.  The format used today to 
classify technological readiness was created by NASA and serves as a risk 
management tool for program managers.  A Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
between one and nine is assigned to all critical technologies, with level one being 
the lowest level of technology readiness (ASD[R&E], 2011).  The list of TRLs, their 
descriptions, and brief discussions of each can be found in Appendix A of this report. 
The program manager (PM) is responsible for planning and conducting the 
TRA, usually after Milestone A.  The TRA should be finalized at least 30 days prior 
to Milestone B.  The PM is responsible for assembling a team of subject matter 
experts (SMEs) knowledgeable in the field for the assessment.  Although there is an 
established procedure for conducting TRAs, in reality they begin well before 
Milestone A, during the Material Solution Analysis (MSA) phase.  The declaration of 
a capability need in the Initial Capabilities Document begins the entire process of 
identifying relevant technologies and assessing their maturity (ASD[R&E], 2011).  It 
is important to note that the assessment of the technology’s maturity is not just the 
SME panel’s knowledge of the technological state of the art, but its prediction of 
what the future holds for that technology.  
6. Some Government Barriers to Innovation 
An area of constant concern to the DoD is how the federal procurement 
process divides the economy into defense and commercial sectors.  Alic, 
Branscomb, Brooks, Carter, and Epstein (1992) noted that this segregation 
“impedes defense access to state-of-the-art technology in the commercial sector” (p. 
134).  They credited the government’s need to pursue oversight, accountability, and 
fairness with this division.  The Packard Commission pressed for acquisition of 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology for cost savings and because the COTS 
equipment is often more technologically advanced than that developed under the 
DoD umbrella. The steeper the S-curve of a given technology, the greater the 
probability of inferiority a weapon system faces by the time it is fielded.   
Utterback (1996) highlighted another important barrier to innovation.  He cited 
the logic of discounted cash-flow analysis as a barrier to innovation strategies, 
stating that the method “favors modest near-term rewards of high probability to 
extravagant long-term possibilities of high uncertainty” (p. 226).  The study of the 
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DoD’s cost-estimation techniques will not be undertaken in this study but should be 
considered when evaluating breakthrough technologies. 
Alic (2013) pointed to yet another barrier to innovation in the current 
acquisition system.  In a protracted technology development phase of a major 
acquisition defense program, once “the design takes on more concrete form, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to revisit the overall concept for reasons including the 
risk that even the appearance of difficulty or delay could invite political attack” (p. 
15).  He pointed to the importance of the architecture by emphasizing that once it is 
defined, “no amount of analysis, modification, and refinement can salvage a difficult 
concept” (p. 15).  This point calls to mind the debacle of the V-22 and JSF 
procurement processes.  The influence of political stakeholders in the procurement 
process cannot be denied. 
C. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY 
The aviation industry provides an excellent platform for evaluation of defense 
research initiatives, due to the close relationship between the federal government 
and the industry.  It is also easy to draw parallels between the early U.S. fixed-wing 
industry and today’s unmanned systems industry.  There are almost 100 years of 
evolutionary history to guide decision-making in future endeavors.   
Lorell (2003) delineated five separate eras in the evolution of the fixed-wing 
industry.  The biplane era was first, followed by the monoplane era, the subsonic jet 
era, the supersonic jet era, and finally the stealth era.  The boundaries of these eras 
cannot be drawn with a fine line.  There is always overlap, as the emerging 
technology competes with the existing technology before it can no longer be denied.  
In some cases, the overlap does not disappear entirely.  The Douglas A-1 Skyraider 
is an excellent example of this overlap.  The Skyraider was originally developed in 
the 1940s but saw continuous use through the 1980s, well through the subsonic and 
supersonic jet eras.  Although the reciprocating engine design was technologically 
inferior to the jet engine, the combination of range, durability, and substantial 
payload made it an ideal close-air support aircraft.  Even as the jet age was 
emerging in the 1950s, A-1 Skyraider designers found ways to eliminate 1,800 
pounds of weight from the airframe, increasing the Skyraider’s range, speed, and 
payload capability (Heinemann, 1953). 
Using the technology S-curve framework, one could produce graphs depicting 
the substitution of technologies across the eras.  Using a metric of airspeed would 
result in little overlap of the S-curves between the biplane and supersonic jet eras.  
However, a payload metric would show significant overlap as each new 
technological leap struggled in the early stages to overcome aerodynamic limitations 
on payload.  Using a metric of range (flight time between refueling), certain 
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reciprocating engine monoplanes have distinct advantages over turbine-engine 
supersonic aircraft. This was among the reasons the A-1 Skyraider was able to 
thrive alongside its more technologically advanced competition. 
One way to gauge industry health could be the number of participants in an 
industry.  Lorell (2003) presented a graph of prime contractors in the U.S. fixed-wing 
aviation industry since its inception. Figure 5 shows the growth of the U.S. fixed-wing 
aviation industry from 1910 to 2000, with the number of prime contractors on the y-
axis.  Fighters (Navy) refers to fighter aircraft procured only by the Navy.  Fighters 
(AF + Navy) refers to fighter aircraft procured jointly by the Navy and Air Force.  
Fighters (AF) refers to fighter aircraft procured only by the Air Force. 
 
Figure 5. Prime Contractors During Fixed-Wing Aircraft Evolution  
(Lorell, 2003) 
Although the U.S. gave birth to powered flight, it did not advance the aviation 
industry as much as other nations leading up to World War I (WWI).  In 1913, the 
U.S. government appropriations to the aviation industry amounted to $125,000, 
while the French government appropriated $7.4 million for aviation (Pattillo, 2000).  
The most significant display of U.S. government recognition of the importance of 
aviation was the establishment of the National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics 
(NACA), an early precursor to NASA, in 1915.  The NACA Langley Memorial 
Aeronautical Laboratory was established in 1917 and became the world’s most 
advanced aviation test and experimentation facility (Pattillo, 2000).  Shortly following 
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the official U.S. declaration of war in 1917, Congress appropriated $640 million for 
the purchase of aircraft, which was to date the single largest defense appropriation 
ever (Pattillo, 2000).   
Thus, the first spike in U.S. military aviation occurred in the run-up to WWI.  
U.S. military aircraft production exploded 400% in 1917 to a peak production of 
14,000 aircraft in 1918 (Lorell, 2003).  At this time, the civilian market expressed 
growing interest.  However, following the armistice, U.S. military budget cutbacks 
crippled the fledgling U.S. industry, resulting in a 90% reduction in funding from 1919 
through 1920 (Lorell, 2003).  The precipitous decline in procurement hampered 
innovation and competition for almost a decade, during which time France boasted 
the world’s largest and best air force.  Lorell (2003) also pointed out government 
procurement decisions that further crippled the industry, like separating design and 
production contracts for a bomber aircraft designed by Glenn L. Martin.  Glenn L. 
Martin won the design contract for a bomber aircraft, but production went to 
Keystone, which resulted in Martin withdrawing from the bomber market for about a 
decade.  Government contracting decisions like this stifled industry and impeded 
innovation for the entire decade.  The decrease in government funding, an immature 
civilian market, and detrimental government policies resulted in staid, conservative 
aircraft design and production that set the U.S. industry back immeasurably (Lorell, 
2003).  The armistice resulted in the cancellation of at least 61,000 aircraft orders 
and the liquidation of 90% of peak production capacity (Pattillo, 2000). 
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The diversity of contractors was also critical to the development of the early 
aviation industry.  As Lorell (2003) noted, while there were five prime aviation 
contractors at the peak of WWI, there were several smaller companies that made 
important contributions to aviation technology.  Actually, 31 aircraft manufacturers 
were listed in the 1919 Jane’s almanac.  Grover Loening’s companies never 
achieved prime status, but early designs resulted in the basis for the M-8, one of 
America’s first fighter planes.  The L-W-F Company, founded by Charles Willard in 
1915, invented the monocoque fuselage, an innovation that created a new 
technology S-curve in aircraft design (Pattillo, 2000). 
Lorell (2003) identified the end of government subsidies for airmail in 1930 as 
the trigger for growth in the commercial industry.  Airlines realized that to remain 
profitable, they had to branch out into passenger transport.  Despite the lack of 
government procurement of military aircraft, the commercial industry made strides in 
building larger, more complex aircraft.  Competition spurred innovation, and Lorell 
(2003) noted the development of stressed skin wings, retractable nose-gear, and 
lighter, cooler-running engines during this time. 
One of the most important developments in the U.S. fixed-wing aviation 
industry was indicative of the benefits of commercial application (Lorell, 2003).  
Competition between Boeing and Martin produced a revolutionary new monoplane 
bomber with the ability to cross over into the commercial market.  As Lorell (2003) 
noted, this dual-use potential was enough to justify the risks taken by the 
competitors, which resulted in bombers being more technologically advanced than 
fighter aircraft at that time.  The Martin B-10 that won the competition also saw 
healthy overseas sales, which accounted for more aircraft than purchased by the 
U.S. government (Lorell, 2003).  On the other hand, the lack of commercial appeal in 
fighter aircraft resulted in the U.S. lagging far behind many countries in fighter 
development.  U.S. fighter production began to pick up once companies realized 
overseas demand for fighters was rapidly increasing (Lorell, 2003). 
NACA proved the effectiveness of government R&D in fixed-wing aviation 
with advances in naval aircraft during this time.  NACA research directly led to the 
development of streamlined cowlings, aluminum structures designed to resist 
saltwater corrosion, and engine nacelles integrated into the wing itself, rather than 
suspended below (Pattillo, 2000).  All these developments crossed over to the 
civilian market as well, propelling further innovation. 
The subsonic jet era following World War II (WWII) saw a decrease in the 
number of prime contractors from 16 to 11, but competition and innovation were high 
due to the emergence of the revolutionary jet technology (Lorell, 2003).  Captured 
German documents detailing experimentation provided the springboard for some 
companies to enter the market.  Companies began taking more risk, buoyed by 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 18 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
increasing government R&D expenditures.  In light of the S-curve discussion, it is 
interesting to note that the first subsonic jet fighters were substantially inferior in 
many ways to propeller-driven aircraft of the era (Lorell, 2003). 
As Lorell (2003) noted, the greatest era of innovation in fixed-wing aircraft 
occurred in the early years of the supersonic jet era.  Lorell (2003) stated that the 
appearance of advanced German research and the surprising capability of the new 
Soviet MIG jet fighters pushed the U.S. to new heights of R&D.  The use of lighter, 
more durable metals (primarily titanium), radical new design features, and increases 
in funds for testing and evaluation resulted in intense competition.  During this era, 
aeronautics was the fastest growing R&D expenditure for the U.S., accounting for 
over 30% of all aviation industry research funding (Hooks, 1990).  Despite its 
fruitfulness, this period was not without difficulty for firms that withdrew from the 
industry when risks did not result in long-term procurement contracts. 
By the early 1960s, exploration began to decline and exploitation of existing 
technology increased.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara changed 
procurement policies in an attempt to cut unnecessary R&D expenditures.  He cut 
prototype and technology demonstration testing significantly and repurposed proven 
aircraft like the McDonnell F4H-1 Phantom II for other missions (Lorell, 2003).  
According to Lorell’s (2003) data, there were 122 manned aircraft R&D programs in 
the 1950s, but only 39 in the 1960s and 1970s combined. 
The stealth technology era was also marked by intense competition and 
innovation, with radical new technologies being developed to limit radar cross 
section.  DARPA played a key role in the development of the revolutionary F-117 
stealth aircraft and other low-radar cross section–related technology (Lorell, 2003).  
Unlike previous eras, stealth technology did not have as much impact on the 
commercial industry due to the sensitivity and costs associated with the advanced 
technology.  This also limited foreign military sales.  However, the F-16 Fighting 
Falcons developed during this time have seen much success in foreign military 
sales, with over 24 nations procuring them (Lorell, 2003). 
Since the stealth era, the fixed-wing aviation industry has seen a dramatic 
drop in the number of manned aircraft programs.  As a result, there are currently 
only three prime contractors in the industry, with larger prime contractors like Boeing 
acquiring historically successful companies like McDonnell-Douglas.  The rapidly 
rising costs of procurement are consuming resources that otherwise could be used 
for R&D of the next technology. 
Now, defense officials are attempting to find the minimum level of activity 
required to sustain a firm’s status as a prime contractor for military aircraft (Birkler et 
al., 2003). The eras of greatest innovation in the U.S. fixed-wing aviation were 
marked with intense competition between several prime contractors.  Innovations 
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often came from lower tier firms striving to create a niche in the industry and rarely 
came from the dominant firms (Birkler et al., 2003).  
This research identifies two themes of greatest importance throughout the 
evolution of the fixed-wing aviation industry.  The greatest periods of innovation and 
competition were spurred not so much by R&D but by market demand, and by the 
realization that international competitors had better technology.  While supply-side 
tools like DARPA were partly responsible for much of the development in more 
sensitive technology, the era of greatest innovation was spurred by the technological 
crossover between military and civilian applications.  This highlights the role that 
demand-side economics plays in technology development. 
The other key theme deals with how the U.S. fell so far behind in aviation 
technology in the period following WWI up to the early to mid-1930s.  The decline in 
funding happened well before the Great Depression.  DoD funding for aviation 
applications from 1917 to 1927 is shown in Figure 7.  The figure shows a dramatic 
drop in defense procurement following the Treaty of Versailles.   
 
Figure 7. Defense Aviation Appropriations 1917–1927  
(Lorell, 2003) 
Figure 8 shows a pronounced gap between the precipitous decline in military 
aircraft production and the initial growth of commercial aircraft production.  Several 
factors led to this gap, but it seems that the loss of military aviation funding crippled 
the fledgling U.S. industry, which relied almost solely on government funding at that 
time, and did not experience the demand-side pull from the economy that defense 
leaders expected due to the immaturity of the industry (Lorell, 2003).  
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Figure 8. U.S. Military and Civilian Aircraft Production  
(Lorell, 2003) 
Figure 9 shows aircraft production from 1910 to 1986.  There is a pronounced 
space between the decline of the military industry following WWI and the growth of 
the civilian industry in the late 1920s.  While there is a decline in civilian production 
following WWII, it recovers quickly with the advent of jet engine and airframe 
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Figure 9. U.S. Aircraft Production 1909–1987  
(Pattillo, 2000) 
In hindsight, it is difficult to understand how defense leaders and the U.S. 
Congress failed to realize the importance of aviation to defense and civilian 
applications.  However, it is important to point out the role government policy played 
in the development of the U.S. aviation industry in later decades.  The repeal of the 
airmail subsidy to aviation companies precipitated the development of passenger 
transport aircraft, which more than any other event led to the resurgence of the U.S. 
aviation industry (Lorell, 2003). 
The fixed-wing aviation industry also emphasized the importance of non-
prime contractors in technology development and innovation.  As stated by 
Utterback (1996) and others, major innovations rarely come from prime contractors 
in an industry.  Rather, the upstarts usually discover the S-curve shifting 
breakthroughs.  Birkler et al. (2003) applied this principle to major technological 
breakthroughs in the fixed-wing aviation industry, and the results confirmed it.  Their 
research found that most of the breakthrough innovations in fixed-wing aviation 
came from non-prime contractors. 
In terms of lead user innovation, it seems that eras with the most significant 
growth benefitted most from lead user input.  Early in fixed-wing aviation history, 
procurement numbers per design were relatively very small, which enabled trial-and-
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to the current fixed-wing aviation industry, where aircraft are expected to last for 
decades and often take decades to get from technology demonstration to 
operational use.  Much of the cost overrun in current procurement is directly 
attributable to extensive airframe modification even after low-scale and full-scale 
production has begun.  For several airframes, the personnel who initially identified 
key performance parameters are often retired from the service before the airframe is 
operationally fielded.  While interaction frequently occurs with warfighters during the 
development and production processes, this interaction often leads to concurrency 
issues, which bear the majority of the blame for cost overruns.  
The Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) method recently developed in the 
acquisition field has benefits and drawbacks, but the interaction between the lead 
user (the warfighter) and the innovative firm is closer than ever.  Company 
representatives work shoulder to shoulder with warfighters around the globe and 
have the flexibility to innovate on the spot, and outside of normal procurement 
chains, to deliver what the warfighter needs most.  
D. EARLY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY EVOLUTION 
The history of information technology is very complex; therefore, this study 
will focus on a few key evolutionary developments strongly influenced by the DoD.  
While DoD involvement in aviation industry planning presents one extreme, its 
involvement in other industries is less intrusive, although no less important.  
However, Utterback and Murray (1977) pointed out that between 1950 and 1970, the 
largest and fastest growing sectors of the electronics market were defense related.  
This section explores three vignettes in the information technology industry 
that provide a basis for comparison with the unmanned systems industry: the 
development of the semiconductor, the experimentation with the VHSIC chip, and 
the development of RFID technology. 
1. The Semiconductor Industry 
This section divides early semiconductor industry history into three periods 
based on the level of U.S. government intervention. 
a. Early Years (1950s and Early 1960s) 
Wilson, Ashton, and Egan (1980) recognized three distinct periods in 
the semiconductor industry.  In the first period, the 1950s and early 1960s, the DoD 
loomed large over both the supply side of R&D funding and the demand side.   
Government R&D support was critical during this early era.  The Air 
Force was the single largest contributor to microelectronic R&D during this era, 
accounting for around 55% of total government R&D for the production of integrated 
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chips (Wilson et al., 1980).  Wilson et al. (1980) identified two ways government 
R&D funding impacted innovation.  First, R&D increased the private company’s 
return-to-risk ratio, and second, R&D increased riskiness on the part of firms sensing 
that a technical breakthrough was imminent.  Wilson et al. (1980) also pointed out 
that while a greater percentage of R&D funding went to well-established companies, 
procurement trended towards newer firms.  This was due to the defense contractor’s 
propensity to award R&D to firms with a proven track record, which obviously 
favored well-established firms (Wilson et al., 1980).   
Universities conducting leading-edge work also received R&D funding 
critical to technology advancement (Wilson et al., 1980). The DoD provided $1 
million to $2 million per year to over 100 doctoral candidates studying solid-state 
electronics in the 1950s, but that research dried up in the 1960s and 1970s (Wilson 
et al., 1980).  
In the microelectronics field, as in the aviation industry, smaller firms 
are extremely important in the development of breakthrough innovations.  The study 
of the growth of Silicon Valley confirms this, particularly the proliferation of the so-
called Fairchildren and their contributions to innovation.  As noted by Hooks (1990), 
monopoly-sector firms supplied only 31% of all semiconductors in 1957, while 
smaller upstarts like Fairchild, Texas Instruments, Hughes, and Transistron supplied 
64%.  Due indirectly to Pentagon funding, it was the smaller companies that made 
the most pronounced breakthroughs in innovation.  In 1954, Texas Instruments, 
relatively new to the semiconductor industry, invented the first silicon transistor 
(Wilson et al., 1980).  Although the gold-bonded diode was invented by Bell 
Laboratories, a newcomer named Transitron developed a process for large-scale 
production in the 1950s (Wilson et al., 1980).  One defense procurement contract to 
the new Texas Instruments firm called for “the design, fabrication, and delivery of 
eighteen different devices in a six-month period” (Wilson et al., 1980, p. 147).  
Wilson et al. (1980) noted that government R&D and procurement radically cut the 
time period from invention to commercialization.    
In 1959, Texas Instruments invented the integrated circuit.  Shortly 
thereafter, Fairchild refined the integrated circuit and developed a mass-production 
technique for them (Hooks, 1990).  In the early 1960s, a spin-off from Fairchild 
named General Microelectronics (GMe) made important contributions to the 
development of metal-oxide semiconductors (MOS), which revolutionized the 
calculator and computer memory market less than a decade later (Wilson et al., 
1980).  
Defense programs like the Minuteman 2 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM) and NASA relied heavily on the new integrated circuits.  The 
flexibility of contracting officers during this time facilitated innovative breakthroughs.  
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In an interview with an industry executive, Wilson et al. (1980) pointed to an 
important vignette: 
For example, one firm persuaded the contracting officer to 
permit it to change from developing an alloy-switching transistor 
to a germanium-mesa transistor for the Minuteman Missile 
project.  The germanium-mesa transistor proved to be a 
success that had considerable spillover into the ability to make 
silicon devices. (p. 147)  
It has been estimated that in the early 1960s, the Minuteman II 
procurement accounted for “60 percent of the total integrated circuit production to 
that date” (Wilson et al., 1980). Several new and later very successful companies, 
including Signetics and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) were begun during this 
period with strategies centered on the military market (Wilson et al., 1980). 
Defense procurement programs significantly accelerated the time to 
achieve economies of scale (Hooks, 1990).  Also, the DoD tended to over specify 
products, choosing performance over cost concerns in most products.  This was due 
to the environmental extremes in which the components needed to operate.  This 
focus on performance instead of cost savings resulted in greatly decreased risk to 
the companies, which in turn spurred innovation (Hooks, 1990).  This over 
specification led to greater focus on quality controls in the production process 
(Wilson et al., 1980). 
Before long, companies learned the value of forward pricing, or pricing 
a product below the current average cost in order to secure a contract, with the 
knowledge that the increase in production volume would allow the firm to take 
advantage of learning curve effects (Duysters, 1996).  The stability of defense R&D 
and procurement resulted in a 95% decrease in the cost of a semiconductor chip 
between 1962 and 1968 (Wilson et al., 1980). 
Also in contrast to the aeronautics industry, where few companies 
fought against advances pushed by the DoD, some firms in the microelectronics 
industry were hostile to DoD R&D efforts in semiconductor technology, which tended 
to upset the foundation of existing, profitable technologies (Hooks, 1990).  Hooks 
(1990) drew a distinction between dominant electronics firms that resisted DoD 
intervention and smaller, emerging firms that relied more on DoD outlays.  The 
dominant firms at the time (throughout the 1950s and 1960s) included Western 
Electric, General Electric, RCA, Raytheon, and Westinghouse, among others.  The 
smaller firms included Texas Instruments, Fairchild, and Hughes.  The 
semiconductor research initiated by the DoD, especially the Air Force, saw major 
breakthroughs come from the smaller firms of the era.  Hooks (1990) pointed to the 
development of the integrated circuit by Texas Instruments and the mass production 
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process developed by Fairchild in 1959.  The breakthroughs in semiconductor 
technology created momentum the commercial marketplace was unable to ignore, 
which resulted in greater R&D outlays from the larger electronics firms, creating a 
snowball effect (Hooks, 1990).   
Although the DoD had a significant effect on the semiconductor 
industry during this time, it was not as pronounced as its effect on the aviation 
industry.  As a comparison, aeronautics programs accounted for 40% of all DoD 
contracts in the years between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, while 
electronics programs accounted for less than 13% (Hooks, 1990).   
b. Second Period (Early 1960s to Late 1960s) 
The second period began in the early 1960s and ended in the late 
1960s.  This period was referred to by Wilson et al. (1980) as the laissez-faire 
period, where government demand for semiconductors was slowly eclipsed by 
market demand, which resulted in a relative decrease in government supply-side 
intervention. 
By the late 1960s, the importance of DoD funding of semiconductor 
exploration began to fade and was replaced and surpassed by commercial R&D 
expenditures.  This transition had two major effects.  The increasing importance of 
commercial funding resulted in a greater focus on cost avoidance (Duysters, 1996).  
Satisficing took the place of over specification.  This, in turn, forced many smaller 
competitors out of the industry and forced industry consolidation.  By the late 1960s, 
only five companies dominated the semiconductor industry: Motorola, Sigintec, 
Westinghouse, Fairchild, and Texas Instruments (Duysters, 1996).  It is interesting to 
note that the last two companies benefitted greatly from DoD R&D expenditures 
early in the integrated chip evolution.  Texas Instruments received the majority of 
Minuteman contracts while Fairchild received the contracts for the Apollo guidance 
project (Alic et al., 1992). 
c. Third Period (Late 1960s to 1970s) 
Wilson et al. (1980) described the third period as one of increasing 
frustration of industry heads with government policy.  The increase in government 
support by foreign countries to their own industry resulted in a power shift in 
semiconductor production overseas, and U.S. government tax and trade policies 
were seen as detrimental to domestic industry.  This resulted in a “more adversarial 
tone” (p. 2) between the U.S. government and the semiconductor industry (Wilson et 
al., 1980). 
U.S. trade policy was one of the most contentious topics in the 1970s.  
Between 1970 and 1975, semiconductor exports grew at an average rate of 17%, 
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but imports increased an average 45% per year during that time (Wilson et al., 
1980).  Japanese government trade policy made it difficult for the U.S. to sell 
semiconductors there, but U.S. policy made it relatively easy for Japanese 
semiconductors to sell in the U.S. 
Despite the difficulties, there were some bright spots in innovation.  
Wilson et al. (1980) pointed to Intel, a new company in 1970, and the innovation of 
the Intel 1103 MOS dynamic random access memory chip that created a new S-
curve for computer applications.  Despite never rising to the ranks of the leading 
semiconductor manufacturers, RAM products by the company Mostek became the 
industry standard in the mid-1970s.  A new U.S. company named Bowmar built upon 
the new semiconductor technology and created the world’s first pocket calculator, an 
amazing innovation at the time (Wilson et al., 1980). 
These inventions resulted in the rise of entry by new firms.  The 
impetus for the rise in entries was not increased R&D funding by the government, 
but by obvious and overwhelming consumer demand for products like computers, 
calculators, and electronic watches.  The maturation of the semiconductor industry 
during this time resulted in increased interoperability of the semiconductor products 
with a wide range of applications, which meant companies that previously had no 
stake in semiconductor development were able to procure them and adapt them to 
their own products (Wilson et al., 1980). 
Wilson et al. (1980) emphasized the importance of substantial outside 
backing to the innovativeness of new firms.  Intel’s R&D spending in 1970 was only 
$1 million, which was small in comparison to the over $100 million spent on R&D 
throughout the industry that year.  However, Wilson et al. (1980) pointed out that a 
million dollars was a relatively large sum to the new Intel company and that funding 
directly resulted in the creation of the 1103 chip.    
d. Semiconductor Summary 
Figure 10 is a depiction of semiconductor industry entrants on the left 
vertical axis and approximate industry sales on the right vertical axis.  The spikes in 
industry entry coincide with major milestones in U.S. defense history.  The first spike 
coincides with the Korean War, as U.S. officials realized that smarter technology 
was needed to counteract the massive land army strength of the Soviets and the 
Chinese.  The second major spike in entrants occurs in 1959, when the space race 
with the Soviets began to heat up.  The last major spike occurs in the late 1960s, 
due to increasing commercial demand, but also in response to the increase in 
hostilities in the Vietnam War and advances in the ICBM programs.  It is also 
important to note that there is an average of five years between spikes in industry 
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entry and spikes in industry shipments, which coincides with the ramp-up time 
needed by firms to increase production (Wilson et al., 1980). 
 
Figure 10. Entrants to the Semiconductor Industry Compared to  
Industry Growth  
(Wilson et al., 1980) 
Government-funded R&D and procurement provided stability for the 
fledgling semiconductor industry in a way that is difficult to duplicate.  The 
government began funding solid-state transistor research during WWII, but sales of 
semiconductors did not show significant growth until the mid- to late 1950s.  The 
government supply-side push was critical during this incubation period to sustain the 
industry until demand-side market forces could find uses for this new technology 
(Wilson et al., 1980).  This incubation period allowed firms to improve production 
yields without the pressures of the marketplace threatening their existence.  For 
example, in the early years, finished semiconductors exhibited a high rate of failure 
during post-production tests.  The incubation period helped these companies 
improve yields on innovative breakthroughs (Wilson et al., 1980). 
Wilson et al. (1980), like Utterback (1996), noted that in the past 
semiconductor industry conditions favored flexible, innovative firms.  However, the 
late 1960s and 1970s witnessed a drying up of venture capital and the rise of foreign 
competition as the impetus for more vertical integration by well-established firms and 
fewer new entries, as seen in Figure 10.    
Table 1 shows the percent distribution of U.S. semiconductor sales 
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U.S. semiconductors in 1960, but that percent begins to decline as the commercial 
market for semiconductors grows.  Within 20 years, the military’s share of 
consumption fell from 50% to 10% (Wilson et al., 1980). 
Table 1. Percent Distribution of U.S. Semiconductor Sales by End Use 
(Wilson et al., 1980, p. 19) 
End Use 1960 1968 1974 1979
Computer 30.0 35.0 28.6 30.0
Consumer 5.0 10.0 23.8 27.5
Military 50.0 35.0 14.3 10.0
Industrial 15.0 20.0 33.3 37.5
Total Value (millions of TY$)  $      560   $   1,211   $  5,400   $10,500  
2. VHSIC Development 
In 1977, the U.S. recovered a Soviet sonobuoy and found high-technology 
integrated circuits copied directly from existing Texas Instruments chips (Naegele, 
1989).  The U.S. realized that the Soviets were catching up and instituted the Very 
High Speed Integrated Circuit Program (VHSIC; Alic et al., 1992).  The program ran 
until 1990 and was one of the highest priority technology programs in the DoD.   
As Tsipis and Janeway (1984) described, the 1970s was the era of large-
scale integration (LSI), with chips containing more than 1,000 components each.  
The next goal at the time was very-large-scale integration (VSLI), which could 
incorporate more than 100,000 components per chip, a 100-fold increase in 
performance over LSI.  In 1977, the U.S. tasked personnel with forming the VHSIC 
office to introduce VLSI systems to defense technology (Tsipis & Janeway, 1984).  It 
is important to note that the program did not officially stand up until 1980 and was 
not fully funded until 1981, during which time the commercial industry had made 
significant strides toward VLSI technology.  Instead of focusing R&D on improving 
current LSI technology, the program office decided to “leapfrog LSI and go directly to 
VLSI, realizing that the VHSIC Program would indirectly pull quite a bit of LSI 
technology into defense systems prior to the availability of VLSI devices” (Tsipis & 
Janeway, 1984, pp. 36–37).  The program office chose to develop VHSIC in the 
commercial industry, rather than establishing government facilities.  At the time, DoD 
R&D and procurement counted for only 7% of the total U.S. semiconductor market 
(Tsipis & Janeway, 1984).    
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The program office took several steps to speed the maturation process of 
VHSIC chips.  In 1984, responding to production delays, the DoD granted a $102 
million subsidy to six contractors to improve pilot production lines in order to 
increase yield and decrease cost of technically acceptable chips.  An additional $90 
million subsidy in 1985 was approved to address equipment-related deficiencies 
(GAO, 1985).   
Although the program led to advances in several microelectronics fields, it fell 
short of goals sought by the DoD.  Alic et al. (1992) stated that the services did not 
proceed wholeheartedly with the program.  The program was originally calculated to 
cost almost $1 billion, of which the program office originally estimated the DoD 
would supply one-third (Tsipis & Janeway, 1984).  The final total cost to the DoD 
was $918 million (VHSIC Program Office, 1990). 
Naegele (1989) pointed to several problems with the VHSIC program.  The 
first major flaw was the inability of the program to get top U.S. chip makers to work 
closely together.  In contracts, the program office inserted a special clause “to 
license and assist government-designated parties to use contract products for 
government purposes” (Tsipis & Janeway, 1984, p. 39).  This hardly materialized.  
Although the DoD initially envisioned contracting directly with chip makers, industry 
leaders recommended systems integrators take the lead, relegating chip makers to 
subcontractor roles.  VHSIC managers saw this as the biggest mistake in the 
program, since chip makers would have marketed the technology more actively 
(Naegele, 1989).  Instead, systems integrators hoarded information from companies 
with whom they were in direct competition in other markets (Naegele, 1989). 
The second major flaw Naegele (1989) noted was the lack of early 
technology-insertion initiatives, which resulted in years of delay between 
development and operational use.  In terms of performance, the processing 
capability of any military weapon system was less than what was available in video 
games.  This increased the calls for program termination, since by the time chips 
made it into fielded weapons systems they were almost always obsolete in 
performance (Naegele, 1989). 
Despite the problems in the VHSIC program, it created many successes.  
Arguably, the most important successes came not from the six chip makers that 
received contracts for VHSIC development, but from the nine chip makers that did 
not (Naegele, 1989).  The DoD call for VHSIC development alerted the entire 
industry to the potential for new capabilities, which spurred innovation by companies 
not wanting to be left behind. 
Naegele (1989) quoted Bud Kaiser, manager of General Electric’s 
Microelectronics Center at the time, “The guys who won the contracts were in the 
catbird seat, because the government paid for their work.  They probably would have 
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built those chipsets anyway” (p. 101).  Naegele noted that although this was true, the 
pace at which the technology matured would not have been as quick without the 
government stimulus.  One of the VHSIC program directors estimated that the 
program put contractors three to five years ahead of where they would have been 
without it (Naegele, 1989).  Although it was rife with problems, the fruits of this 
research were on display during Operation Desert Storm. 
Instances of friction between military and commercial entities in the 
production of computer hardware arise throughout the literature.  The military’s need 
for over engineering of computer hardware often results in a product undesirable in 
the commercial market, mainly due to cost.  The need for electronic circuitry to 
survive environmental extremes does not often result in overwhelming market 
demand.  Another source of friction is the inherent government bureaucracy that 
almost always delays introduction of new technology.  One of the highest priorities in 
DoD history, the development of the VHSIC, took over four years from conception to 
receive full funding (Tsipis & Janeway, 1984).  Although the VHSIC made material 
contributions to the computer industry and shifted S-curves in many areas due to 
breakthrough technology, the commercial market was able to make significant 
progress in commercial-grade VLSI technology without DoD input.     
3. RFID Development 
The development and commercialization of the radio frequency identification 
(RFID) chip also provides a useful basis for comparison.  WWII served as the 
proving ground for RFID technology during WWII, when the British placed active 
transmitters on their aircraft to alert their nation’s radar system of their friendly status 
(Roberti, 2005).  Concerted R&D of RFID technology began in the 1950s and was 
heavily sponsored by the DoD.  The Gulf War in the early 1990s resulted in another 
wave of DoD R&D spending to improve tracking of shipping containers to the 
Persian Gulf.  DoD funding at Pacific Northwest National Labs helped develop micro 
RFID technology for tracking purposes (Dew, 2006). 
The lack of a global RFID standardization system hampered exploitation of 
RFID technology.  The first system that emerged, Passive Reader Active Tag 
(PRAT), used an RFID transmitter that carried detailed information about the 
product, capable of being used by various scanners to transmit product information.  
This capability increased the complexity, and, therefore, the cost of the RFID tag.  
The other system, which revolutionized the industry, was Active Reader Passive Tag 
(ARPT).  ARPT used an RFID transmitter that broadcast a single numerical code 
that would be looked up by an online database for all pertinent information.  The 
drawback was that the scanning computer had to be interoperable with the device to 
look up the product information, but the upside was that transmitters became much 
simpler, since they only needed to transmit a numerical code, like a bar code 
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scanner.  It was generally assumed there should be one standard for all commercial 
RFID systems, but firms developing rival system architectures competed over which 
would dominate the industry (Dew, 2006).   
The Electronic Product Code (EPC) numbering scheme used an open-
architecture format and an RFID transmitter that broadcast a single numerical code.  
In the early 2000s, the DoD and Walmart declared for the EPC format and forbade 
the use of proprietary technology.  This joint government/commercial signal for open 
architecture and non-proprietary technology is solidifying use of the EPC format 
(Dew, 2006).   
4. Information Technology Industry Summary 
The research of Wilson et al. (1980) shows that government R&D funds and 
procurement contracts were critical to innovation in the early years of semiconductor 
technology.  The R&D reduced the technical risk faced by a company, while 
procurement contracts reduced the company’s market risk (Wilson et al., 1980). 
In terms of lead user innovation, the companies on the cutting edge of 
innovation were often the lead users themselves.  Many semiconductor companies 
used the microchips they created in end items also produced by the company.  
Those that did not use their own microchips were often intimately linked to the 
recipient, including the DoD.  The incredibly fast-paced cycle of technological 
advancement in the microelectronics field required lead user feedback, lest the end 
items be rendered obsolete or completely useless before they reached the 
marketplace.  
Utterback and Murray (1977) summed up DoD intervention in the electronics 
industry by stating that the DoD had an obvious and significant impact on the civilian 
electronics industry, but not in the way one might think.  Up to 1977, no innovations 
resulted directly from DoD intervention.  And although government procurement has 
resulted in exponentially larger commercial firm R&D funding, this R&D is mostly 
spent on “short run problems and improvements and at productivity” (Utterback & 
Murray, 1977, p. 2).  Utterback and Murray (1977) stated the point best: 
Defense procurement and spending and sponsorship of R&D have 
stimulated the civilian electronics industry to introduce new products 
more rapidly and have led to dramatic increases in the performance 
and reliability of electronics components and equipment. (p. 28)  
In terms of manpower influences in the civilian electronics industry, Utterback and 
Murray (1977) found that 
defense support of R&D in universities and captive laboratories 
provided much of the training and many of the skilled human resources 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 32 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
needed for the growth of the civilian industry, especially by smaller 
firms and new entrants. (p. 38) 
Utterback and Murray (1977) also discussed the role that other positive 
government policies, such as second-sourcing and liberal licensing, had on the 
microelectronics industry. 
While this discussion by Utterback and Murray (1977) primarily concerned the 
civilian electronics industry, it has important implications for all industries.  Even 
when government R&D funds are not producing headline-grabbing innovations, they 
are almost always improving the general knowledge and capacity of the field.  
Utterback and Murray (1977) pointed to the DoD’s role as an information 
clearinghouse in the dissemination of semiconductor knowledge throughout the 
industry, which acted as a catalyst for innovation.  Holbrook (1995) pointed to a 1952 
defense symposium on transistor science, engineering, and manufacturing that 
spread information on AT&T patents as an important catalyst in the growth of the 
semiconductor industry. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS 
There are several themes that pervade the literature review of the fixed-wing 
aviation and information technology industries. 
 Point A: Government funding and procurement have been critical in the 
development of key technologies while serving as incubators for infant 
industries. 
The contrast between the early fixed-wing aviation industry and the 
electronics industry is evident.  Government funding in the fixed-wing aviation 
industry directly led to dramatic breakthroughs in technology and innovation.  
Indeed, many technological advances were applicable only to the government, 
specifically stealth and weapons employment.  In contrast, electronics technology 
almost never directly benefitted from government outlays, but government 
procurement and R&D were very beneficial to the industry nonetheless.  
Government outlays were absolutely critical to achieving the U.S. global 
technological dominance in both industries. 
In the fixed-wing aviation industry, government procurement and R&D kept 
the U.S. at the cutting edge of technology.  Government outlays resulted in much 
innovation.  The circa-WWI fixed-wing aviation industry rose and fell with 
government procurement, crashing as spectacularly as it grew.  In contrast, 
government efforts never directly resulted in cutting-edge technology in the 
electronics industry.  As in the VHSIC case, the DoD product was often 
technologically obsolete by the time it was fielded, due to more rapid innovation in 
the civilian marketplace and burdensome, slow DoD acquisition processes. 
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Government funds were present at the earliest stages of both industries, 
allowing them to overcome growing pains before the market forces took hold.  Here, 
we see a stark contrast between the industries.  The importance of government 
intervention in the aviation industry is obvious, given the so-called lost decade after 
WWI where the industry struggled to make gains and actually fell behind other 
nations.  In contrast, the semiconductor industry experienced more even growth.  In 
both cases, government R&D and procurement made up a majority of industry 
funding in the earliest years. 
This study is important to understand the benefits and limitations of 
government outlays.  Government outlays can be extremely beneficial to an industry 
but are rarely the sole propellant of technological innovation.   
 Point B: However, while important to technological development, 
government R&D funding has rarely been as important as the 
government’s procurement decisions (market demand). 
In most research, marketplace demand seems to be the most effective 
stimulus for innovation.  Particularly in the information technology industry, whose 
leading companies have often been hostile to government intervention, lengthy 
government procurement processes often resulted in technology that was obsolete 
by the time it was fielded.  With fixed-wing aviation, eras with the most intense 
competition featured developments that favored civilian applications, such as the 
end of airmail subsidies and R&D for bomber and transport aircraft in the 1930s.  
 Point C: Major innovative breakthroughs predominantly come from 
lower tier contractors and smaller companies. 
Historically, major innovative breakthroughs that shift technology S-curves 
have not come from the leading prime contractors of an industry.  In the information 
technology industry, it can be argued that many of the smaller companies that 
developed breakthrough innovations were formed with personnel that defected from 
larger companies.  This does not disprove the hypothesis; instead, it reinforces the 
idea that lower restrictions and higher competition experienced by companies 
struggling to survive and compete compel those companies to take risks that larger 
companies might not.  
 Point D: Lapses in government attention to areas in both industries 
resulted in a loss of U.S. global dominance in those areas. 
The fixed-wing aviation industry was crippled in the years following WWI, and 
France quickly became the leading global force in aviation technology due to 
aggressive procurement and R&D.  Government funding was cut before the civilian 
marketplace was ready to take up the slack.  It would take over a decade to get the 
U.S. fixed-wing aviation industry back on its feet following the Armistice.   
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Likewise, the recovery of the Soviet sonobuoy in 1977 revealed critical 
weaknesses in an otherwise dominant U.S. semiconductor industry.  The U.S. 
semiconductor industry has suffered greatly with the rise in production capabilities in 
east Asia.  While many technological breakthroughs still occur on American soil, 
outsourcing has resulted in a drain of production overseas where tax conditions and 
labor rates are more favorable. 
 Point E: Flexibility in the procurement process can increase lead user 
input and result in more rapid fielding of innovative breakthroughs. 
As with the Minuteman 2 ICBM example and the early years of aviation, 
technological advancement often occurs rapidly and must be prepared for despite 
the limitations of reliable forecasting.  An acquisition establishment that values lead 
user feedback will be better prepared to switch technologies when necessary. 
These evolutionary vignettes provide an important framework for the 
discussion of unmanned systems acquisition.  The effect of DoD funds on each 
industry, especially in immature eras, can guide acquisition strategy decisions today. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
I use the comparative analysis methodology to place the current unmanned 
systems industry in context.  I compare today’s unmanned systems industry with the 
early fixed-wing aviation industry and the early information technology industry to 
draw parallels between prime contractor levels, government policies toward the 
industries, innovative breakthroughs that propelled the industries, and importance of 
the technologies to national security. 
The conclusion of the literature review featured a framework for comparison 
between the industries: 
 Point A: Government funding and procurement have been critical in the 
development of key technologies while serving as incubators for infant 
industries.  
I examine key technological advancements resulting from government 
funding in each of the industries.  I also quantitatively show an increase in innovation 
resulting from an increase in government funding and qualitatively analyze historical 
sources to show that government procurement and R&D ensured the survival and 
growth of each industry before market forces assumed lead roles. 
 Point B: However, while important to technological development, 
government R&D funding has rarely been as important as the 
government’s procurement decisions (market demand).  
I attempt to show quantitatively that market demand and procurement have 
provided more of an impetus for innovation than government R&D. 
 Point C: Major innovative breakthroughs predominantly come from 
lower tier contractors and smaller companies.   
I qualitatively prove that the unmanned systems industry is much like other 
industries where the largest companies rarely make the most significant innovations. 
 Point D: Lapses in government attention to areas in both industries 
resulted in a loss of U.S. global dominance in those areas.   
I qualitatively show how a decrease in government procurement and R&D 
have led to declines in U.S. dominance in both of the historical industries and show 
how the unmanned systems industry could see similar results, given defense budget 
cutbacks. 
 Point E: Flexibility in the procurement process can increase lead user 
input and result in more rapid fielding of innovative breakthroughs.   
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I discuss unconventional acquisition practices in all three industries and 
qualitatively show how unconventional procurement practices have led to increased 
innovation in all three industries.    
The purpose of this comparative analysis is to draw parallels useful for 
informing an acquisition strategy that will ensure the health of the industry and the 
U.S. DoD’s technological dominance on the battlefield. 
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IV. STATE OF THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INDUSTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I discuss the current state of the U.S. unmanned systems 
industry, including industry structure, current trends, and forecasts of industry 
development. 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY 
Unmanned systems have existed for a long time.  However, research still 
identifies the unmanned systems industry as infant, due to only recent growth in 
advanced navigation and communications technologies that allow unmanned 
systems to be operated from greater distances.  The maturation of global satellite 
bandwidth technology made possible the proliferation of systems in the recent wars, 
from Kosovo to the present day.  These developments and the de-classification of 
advanced technology have led to unprecedented growth and demand (Gertler, 
2012). 
The U.S. has been developing and procuring unmanned systems for 
decades, beginning with target drones developed by the Air Force in the 1950s.  For 
decades thereafter, much of the early work on unmanned systems occurred in highly 
classified programs.  Early unmanned systems development was spurred by the 
shoot-down of Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane in 1960, after which the Air Force 
approved $70 million (over $440 million in FY2013 dollars) for the Red Wagon UAV 
program.  This program was vetoed by the Director of Defense Research & 
Engineering in favor of manned aircraft and satellite technology (Ehrhard, 2010). 
In 1962, Ryan Aeronautical received over $1 million to develop the Model 
147A Fire Fly reconnaissance drone, which performed so well the Air Force ordered 
seven improved drones at the cost of $13 million.  This contract marked the UAV 
transition from prototype phase to advanced operational phase.  Until the 1980s, 
UAV programs won a few contracts and made important advancements but could 
not deliver results like the burgeoning satellite industry, and the DoD terminated 
each UAV program.  Also, in the 1980s and 90s, the Advanced Airborne 
Reconnaissance System (AARS) program received large sums of money, only to be 
canceled at the end of the Cold War due to unprecedented cost overruns and 
increasing Air Force interest in the B-2 program and satellite technology (Ehrhard, 
2010). 
As with the other industries studied in this report, innovative breakthroughs 
have predominantly come from smaller, lower tier companies.  The most famous 
example is the development of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).  One of 
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the most successful unmanned systems in the world, the Predator began in the 
garage of Abraham Karem, an Israeli–American inventor whose initial design was 
made of plywood, homemade fiberglass, and a go-kart engine and named Albatross.  
Karem’s design required only three people to operate, drastically fewer than the 30 
people required to operate the dominant UAV of that time, the Aquila.  DARPA 
recognized the breakthrough technology and sponsored the development of an 
upgraded model named Amber.  Karem’s invention caught the attention (and 
funding) of DARPA, after which he upgraded the Albatross to the Amber, which cost 
just $350,000, less than one hour of flight time for the Aquila (“The Dronefather,” 
2012). 
Despite revolutionizing UAV design and performance, the DoD combined all 
UAV research into a single program in 1987 and canceled Amber, a move Karem 
blamed on the largest firms in the industry.  Karem’s work was sold twice, ending up 
with General Atomics where it became the Predator, the most recognized and 
accomplished UAV in the inventory (“The Dronefather,” 2012).  Karem had 
completely broken the mold of UAVs that had until then resembled manned aircraft 
with no cockpit (Whittle, 2013).  
Karem’s design team, again with DARPA funding, was also responsible for 
the A160 Hummingbird, an unmanned helicopter cargo vehicle he developed under 
his new company, Frontier Systems, which was subsequently sold to Boeing (“The 
Dronefather,” 2012).  The A160T version recently competed against the Kaman K-
Max for the Marine Corps’ unmanned aerial cargo vehicle contract, discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Likewise, a relatively small company, AeroVironment, initiated the small, man-
portable UAV revolution with the Pointer, which it sold to the DoD on a small scale 
before 9/11.  The Pointer’s worth was proven in Afghanistan immediately following 
9/11, and AeroVironment went from revenues of $29.4 million in 2001 to revenues of 
$300 million a decade later due to multiple small UAV contracts (Finn, 2011). 
1. The DARO Experiment  
Skeptics sometimes ask why unmanned systems, especially UAVs, are not 
consolidated under a single service, to minimize duplicative development.  This 
actually occurred in 1993 with the establishment of the Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office (DARO), which was formed “as both a punishment for the 
services’ apparent lack of emphasis on this combat support specialty and as a 
supposed means of achieving greater integration and economy” (Ehrhard, 2010, p. 
46).  Before DARO’s formation, individual services maintained autonomy in 
acquisition of weapons systems, much like today.  DARO officials felt that “the 
services had to be marginalized to realize innovation” (Ehrhard, 2010, p. 46). 
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Ehrhard (2010) pointed to several problems with DARO.  First, by 
consolidating acquisition of all UAV assets into civilian hands, DARO increased 
inter-service tension, as each service had to turn over all UAV funding to DARO.  
DARO fought hard for commonality of airframes, searching for a “one-size-fits-all” 
UAV.  This failed on several accounts, most notably because Army and Air Force 
requirements were very different from Navy and Marine Corps requirements for 
maritime compatibility (Ehrhard, 2010). 
The lead user discussion is important here.  While DARO had no operational 
control over UAVs, it was responsible for their development, including “sensors, data 
links, data relays, and ground stations” (Ehrhard, 2010, p. 48).  It seems that lead 
user input was sacrificed at times for commonality and efficiency, which actually 
stifled innovation during this time.  Only one UAV program made it to operational 
status during the DARO years: the Predator. 
DARO lasted only five years.  Ehrhard (2010) stated that “DARO extended 
the general lethargy of U.S. military integration, and in the process, increasingly 
alienated the services and Congress” (p. 47).  This is most surprising considering 
the technological developments of the 1990s that should have ushered in a golden 
age, given the development of GPS, increased computing power, and increased 
casualty avoidance awareness. Ehrhard (2010) summed up DARO’s tenure thus: 
After five years of trying UAV innovation by fiat, the UAV acquisition 
process returned to its natural, if imperfect state.  At the beginning, 
OSD apparatchiks were sure they could break down the barriers to 
innovation by neutering the service. They suffered from what defense 
organization historian Paul Hammond called, “the mistaken belief that 
service interests are not really real, and hence can be overcome by an 
act of will.” (p. 56) 
It appears from this examination that consolidation into a single service does 
not necessarily achieve efficiencies and instead actually stifles innovation and the 
lead user feedback process that is critical to innovation.  Ehrhard (2010) also had 
several other critical assessments: 
The 1990s reinforced an immutable truth concerning weapon system 
innovation. … The services, as end users, require substantial 
autonomy at each stage of the weapons system innovation process. … 
[T]he symbiosis between service and machine required for combat 
innovation depends on the mobilization of an internal constituency. (p. 
87) 
Ehrhard (2010) followed up with this comment: 
The ultimate goal of weapon system innovation is its novel, effective 
use in combat, and as a byproduct, its enduring integration into a 
service’s support structure. … The meteoric rise and fall of [DARO] 
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provided strong evidence that “pluralism and untidiness” indeed may 
be the only way for the U.S. military to achieve weapon system 
innovation with the UAV. (p. 87) 
Much like in the civilian marketplace, the competition between services 
actually fostered a healthier environment for innovation in the unmanned systems 
industry.  Despite the monopsony condition, the services provided enough stimulus 
to encourage innovation and competition among the small pool of contractors, 
keeping the industry viable until technology and non-defense market demand caught 
up. 
C. U.S. UNMANNED SYSTEMS INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
As seen in Appendix A, there are more than 31 contractors that supply 
unmanned systems to the DoD.  This is a relatively large number, considering the 
presence of all three prime contractors (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop 
Grumman) in the market and their highly popular designs.  Since the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11, the DoD UAV inventory has gone from 167 aircraft to over 11,300 today 
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013).  
Figure 11 shows the number of firms receiving Product Service Code (PSC) 
1550 funds per fiscal year.  The PSC 1550 is the easiest code to track unmanned 
obligations, since it is the most distinctly related to unmanned systems.  I chose PSC 
over the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) because NAICS 
codes are far more generic, with no code directly targeting unmanned robotics 
technologies.  Several different NAICS codes are used in lieu of PSC 1550 but are 
also applicable to non-robotics technologies.  Although PSC 1550 carries the 
designation Drones, the code is also used at times for unmanned ground and 
maritime systems.  PSC 1550 was first used in 1979.  Data are missing for the years 
1985 and 1988 in the FPDS-NG database.  The distribution reached a high of 44 
separate companies in 2011 and has remained at 37 for the past two years (2012–
2013).  Research has shown that high industry participation levels increase 
competition and the potential for breakthrough innovation.   
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Figure 11. Number of Different Firms Receiving PSC 1550 Funding  
(Federal Procurement Data System [FPDS], 2013) 
The chart shows a rapid increase in the number of companies receiving funds 
leading up to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm but shows a marked decline 
after that conflict.  The testing beds of Iraq and Afghanistan led to a dramatic 
increase in the number of companies following the September 11, 2001 attacks.  It is 
important to note that despite advances in GPS technology and long-range 
communications, the number of industry participants remained relatively stable 
throughout the mid- to late 1990s. 
D. CURRENT UNMANNED SYSTEMS MARKET TRENDS  
Spending on unmanned systems has grown exponentially in the past few 
decades.  The obligations shown in Figure 12 are for PSC 1550 total budget 
obligations through 2012.  The fiscal year (FY) 2013 total as of September 30, 2013, 
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Figure 12. Sum of Defense Obligations for PSC Code 1550  
(FPDS, 2013) 
The unmanned systems industry in its current state is flexible and responsive 
to demand conditions.  Sweetman and Eshel (2013) noted that the unmanned 
aviation system industry is already diverging in response to market demand.  The 
cumbersome truck-mounted configurations for launching UAVs are already giving 
way to the smaller man-portable systems or runway-launched aircraft in response to 
consumer demand.  In this case, the consumer, or lead user, is the warfighter.  In 
the current environment of rapid procurement initiatives, the lead user has almost 
unprecedented access to the ear of the producer, shortening the feedback process 
and increasing the flexibility of industry to provide a solution to combat needs.  By 
spreading outlays to many contractors, the DoD procurement system has bought the 
flexibility to experiment in the field and find what works, and most important, what 
does not work. 
In a RAND report on competition and innovation, Drezner (2009) pointed to 
the unmanned systems industry as an opportunity for innovative competition, citing 
lower barriers to entry and few truly dominant players as evidence that the industry 
is primed to grow.  This is in contrast to the fixed-wing aviation industry, where more 
mature technologies and increased focus on airframe commonality lead to less 
competition and innovation. 
Although the U.S. has invested heavily (relative to other nations) in the 
defense robotics industry in the past two decades, investment in the commercial 
robotics industry is a fraction of that spent in other developed nations (Computing 
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is the limited research infrastructure in the U.S.  Currently, “many of the proposed 
efforts, and in particular hardware or software integration efforts, fall outside the 
scope of existing funding programs” (Computing Community Consortium, 2009, p. 
59).  
1. Unconventional Acquisition Methods 
The DoD also benefits from unconventional unmanned systems procurement 
methods.  These methods are getting revolutionary assets to the theater of war in 
compressed time frames, increasing operational capabilities, and preserving human 
lives.  They are also taking advantage of relatively new contractual arrangements 
that focus more on outcomes, not parts or services.   
Arguably the most successful UAV variant to date, the Predator, transitioned 
straight from the technology demonstration phase to production, effectively 
bypassing the development phase.  While later on this resulted in having to rework 
the communications and targeting systems to correct deficiencies, the success 
enjoyed by this program has been undeniable (GAO, 2009). 
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process was 
implemented in 2003 to assist the Joint Requirements and Oversight Council 
(JROC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in “identifying, 
assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements” (CJCS, 
2012, p. 1).  JCIDS was developed for combatant commanders to identify capability 
gaps that might not be specific to any one service.  The acquisition channels could 
then address that gap with minimal overlap in development and procurement from 
competing services (CJCS, 2012).  However, there has been much criticism of the 
JCIDS process, primarily due to its cumbersome and time-consuming response to 
identified gaps.  Some argue that it is difficult to apply the JCIDS process to a 
specific adversary or environment, since it is inherently forward looking (Valin, 
2008).  
Another complaint with the JCIDS process has been the lack of 
synchronization with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system 
designed to fund service programs.  While the JCIDS process can mandate unified 
procurement, each individual service approves its own budget, which may or may 
not prioritize programs the same way.  The GAO (2009) saw this as a stumbling 
block to greater commonality and efficiency in the procurement process. 
The lead user discussion is important in the discussion of the JCIDS process.  
The JCIDS process identifies the “lead users” as the regional and functional 
combatant commanders.  The intent is for the combatant commanders to provide 
feedback in the early phases of product development, to ensure that it fills capability 
gaps (CJCS, 2012).  The problem usually lies with the length of the JCIDS process.  
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Procurement schedules for programs can stretch for decades, while combatant 
commanders and theater requirements frequently change.  One must also scrutinize 
the feedback given by the combatant commanders, since they are rarely actually 
employing the new product themselves. 
The unmanned systems proliferation of the past decade has been successful 
in large part because it has circumvented the normal time-consuming procurement 
process.  Many of the urgent demands have come from those closest to the fight, 
and it is arguably those lead users who provide the most useful feedback to the 
producers.  Add to that a healthy, commercially viable industry capable of 
responding to these true lead user demands and it is a powerful asset, although 
admittedly there will be duplicative development that consumes, but not always 
wastes, resources. 
The Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) program was established to 
respond quickly to capability gaps identified by combatant commanders.  The JUON 
process has a staffing goal of 15 days after the JUON submission, with a complete 
development and fielding time frame of not more than 24 months (CJCS, 2012).  
The search for an unmanned cargo aircraft was one such JUON program with 
positive results.  In 2010, the USMC split a $75 million fixed-price contract award 
between Boeing and Lockheed Martin to procure an unmanned helicopter capable of 
external cargo transport, granting $45.8 million to Lockheed Martin and Kaman, and 
$29.2 million to Boeing, for development of the A160T unmanned rotorcraft (Putrich, 
2010).  The Marine Corps selected the K-Max, and within one year two K-Max 
unmanned helicopters were in operational use delivering cargo in Afghanistan 
(Hoffman, 2013).  The speed with which the USMC procured and fielded the K-Max 
is almost unprecedented.  The companies involved had been developing the 
prototypes for years, demonstrating them to the services in years prior.  The ability 
of these companies to conduct R&D and provide functional products immediately 
demonstrates the benefit of perpetual RDT&E investment.  
The use of PBL has been very effective in unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
deployment.  Under PBL, the DoD pays for “weapons system performance over the 
entire life cycle of the systems” (Vitasek, Geary, & Quick, 2006, p. 1), instead of 
paying for “individual transactions for things like spare parts, repairs, or hours of 
technical support” (Vitasek et al., 2006, p. 1).  
Owings (2010) detailed the success of the PBL practice with the RQ-7B 
Shadow Tactical UAS.  The DoD provides required metrics, and it is up to the 
contractor to determine how best to meet them.  Although the Army owns the UAS 
assets, AAI Corporation controls the configurations and is responsible for meeting 
the metrics.  By shifting performance responsibility to the contractor, the DoD can 
reduce total ownership cost and benefit from contractor measures to improve 
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efficiencies.  Owings (2010) discussed the revision of metrics that resulted in a 
significant reduction in mishaps per 100,000 flight hours from 450 to 150.  The Insitu 
ScanEagle benefits from similar arrangements, whose contractors are responsible 
for over 700,000 combat hours, for which the DoD pays an hourly sensor-over-target 
rate.   
These creative arrangements can be mutually beneficial to the DoD and the 
contractor.  Such arrangements can be profitable to the companies, and as 
Sweetman and Eshel (2013) pointed out, the focus on metrics allows for the 
unmanned system to be upgraded outside of conventional acquisition channels.  
Innovations can be immediately implemented into the asset as long as the 
contracted metrics are still met.  This flexibility and freedom is not without risk, but 
the unmanned system industry can take advantage of this procurement program to 
attain efficiencies while meeting target metrics. 
Tadjdeh (2013b) pointed to the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) as a 
model for shortening the lead user feedback loop.  The REF was responsible for the 
procurement of AeroVironment’s Puma UAV, which has now become a program of 
record.  The REF communicates directly between the lead user and AeroVironment 
for upgrades demanded by the warfighter.    
Not all rapid acquisition processes have been smooth.  The cancellation of 
the Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) in early 2013 marked the end 
of a difficult and questionable procurement process.  Originally designed to cost 
$150 million and take 18 months from design to prototype, the process took over two 
years, and costs ballooned to $270 million per LEMV.  Immediately, the Army had 
problems with competing contracts, with only two prime contractors, Lockheed 
Martin and Northrop Grumman, submitting bids.  When Lockheed Martin realized the 
development schedule was only 18 months, they withdrew from the competition 
although they already had invested in blimp research.  This left Northrop Grumman 
as the only competitor. According to Axe’s (2013) research, the Army Intelligence 
community decided to bypass traditional acquisition channels and went straight to 
Congress for funding.  The LEMV experienced a rash of problems, including 
schedule overruns, cost overruns, and drastic weight overruns, resulting in an 
airship that could stay aloft only a fraction of the time originally estimated.  All these 
issues combined with the impending budget cuts to doom the LEMV, calling into 
question the Army Intelligence community’s ability to assess TRLs, a process for 
which much time and effort is dedicated in the acquisition community (Axe, 2013).  
The LEMV vignette proves the importance of technology readiness assessments.  
The importance of identifying the maturity of a technology cannot be understated.  
Some question why there are so many UAV variants in service.  Gertler 
(2012) summed it up best by emphasizing the role of urgent needs funding, which 
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has allowed combatant commanders to field technology without the drawn-out 
procurement processes normally encountered.  This has drawn complaints from the 
GAO (2009), which points to concurrent development of similar sensor payloads for 
Air Force and Army Predator UAVs as a sign of waste.  While the GAO takes a 
pessimistic view towards the alleged overlap, the differing capabilities demanded by 
each service might in effect be broadening the knowledge base of sensor technology 
by distributing funds across more companies than if a single sensor was developed 
by both services.  In fact, the components of the Army MQ-1 variant sensor are 
produced by Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin, whereas the Air 
Force variant sensors are produced solely by Raytheon (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense [OUSD(AT&L)], 2012).  Gertler (2012) seemed to lament the 
JUONS process, stating, 
Instead of traditional competitions in which systems may be tested 
against each other in advance of operations, new UAS have been 
deployed directly to the field, where US forces are able to experiment 
with and exploit their capabilities.  The combination of funding, 
demand, and technological innovation has resulted in DoD acquiring a 
multiplicity of systems without significant effort to reduce the number of 
systems or consolidate functions across services. (p. 6) 
Gertler (2012) argued for “centralization of UAS acquisition authority, to ensure unity 
of effort and inhibit wasteful spending” (p. 10).  He also stated “if UAS efforts are too 
centralized, some fear that competition and innovation may be repressed” (p. 10).  
“Some” fear that, because it is exactly what happened in the case of the DARO in 
the mid-1990s.  There is a precedent for acquisition consolidation during combat 
operations (Kosovo) and during a period of greater technological innovation (GPS, 
communications, and so on).  Gertler (2012) also pointed to a 2005 GAO testimony 
to the House Armed Services Subcommittee criticizing the DoD for lack of UAV 
acquisition oversight, which Gertler saw as GAO campaigning for a central 
acquisition authority.  DARO’s short-lived tenure proved that efforts to consolidate at 
the expense of the services’ needs actually stifle innovation and competition, which 
could possibly lead to greater costs in the long run.  
2. Demand-Side Constraints 
While the previous sections have highlighted the more encouraging aspects 
of the industry, there are several roadblocks to further growth and success in the 
U.S. robotics industry.  Dew (2012) identified five demand-side constraints on the 
unmanned systems industry that threaten its long-term growth potential.   
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 47 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
a. The Perceived Lack of Well-Articulated Uses for Robotics 
Technology 
The first is the perceived lack of well-articulated uses for robotics 
technology.  Unmanned systems, specifically unmanned aviation systems, have 
been the victim of a smear campaign in the media due to reports of drone strikes 
and an increase in domestic government spying.  The DoD is constantly fighting the 
media war on unmanned systems but must find ways to highlight the technological 
capabilities that can propel the unmanned systems industry.  The success of the 
Lockheed/Kaman K-MAX unmanned cargo helicopter has greatly appealed to the 
U.S. parcel service market, and other capabilities, such as 3D mapping, have caught 
the attention of other civilian agencies and companies (Dew, 2012).   
b. Prohibitive Cost of Implementation 
Dew’s (2012) second demand-side constraint concerns the prohibitive 
cost of implementation.  In the agriculture industry, where civilian demand for 
unmanned systems is forecast to be the greatest (Jenkins & Vasigh, 2013), 
estimates for the cost of one UAV range from $10,000 for small UAVs to $100,000 
for the large, 3D-mapping UAVs (Caspers-Simmet, 2013), although the article noted 
that prices are dropping rapidly.  An increase in production volume could lead to 
drastic decreases in prices for civilian and military applications alike. 
In the DoD, unmanned systems are constantly competing with manned 
counterparts for funding.  Parsons (2013) noted that evolution in maritime unmanned 
systems has been stunted by the demand for explosive disposal technologies and 
by the Ohio-class submarine program.  This is similar to the rejection of UAVs by the 
Air Force in the early years of growth.  Unmanned systems will always compete 
against manned systems and other budget priorities for funding.  
c. The Risk of Technology Maturity and Unknown 
Implementation Costs 
Dew’s (2012) third demand-side constraint addresses the risk of 
technology immaturity and unknown implementation costs.  The DoD has benefitted 
greatly from the ability to spend money on risky technology.  In the fixed-wing 
aviation industry, R&D outlays on risky technology directly led to breakthroughs in 
aviation technology, even in the case of stealth and supersonic technology where 
there was no foreseeable civilian market response to offset the risk.  As with the 
VHSIC study, even though DoD expenditures did not lead to technological 
breakthroughs in the semiconductor industry, the research resulted in incremental 
advances that prodded the slumping civilian microelectronics industry to new 
heights.  The DoD has served as a critical incubator of the unmanned systems 
industry.  It is important to note that in some areas such as stealth capability and 
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weapons delivery technology, the DoD will continue to be one of the only customers, 
regardless of the anticipated increase in market size.   
The risk of technology immaturity has been highlighted by GAO reports 
concerned about cost overruns, of which unmanned systems programs have had 
their share.  In a 2006 report, the GAO documented overruns in the Global Hawk 
and Predator programs.  While both programs experienced cost overruns, the 
differing acquisition strategies of the two programs produced remarkably different 
results.  Between 2001 and 2006, the Global Hawk experienced development cost 
overruns of $1.5 billion (a 166% overrun).  The report (GAO, 2006) noted that the 
Global Hawk sought a “quantum leap in capabilities” (p. 11).  The cost overruns 
were due to “substantial overlap in development, testing, and production” (p. 2), 
resulting from the high degree of technological immaturity of components.  In 
contrast, the Predator program saw development cost overruns of $24 million (a 
16% overrun) between 2004 and 2006.  The incremental approach to development 
of the Predator, more closely in line with commercial best practices resulted in the 
improved budget (GAO, 2006). 
Although the UAV industry has often been chided for duplicative 
development efforts, there are several cases that prove the necessity of service-
specific requirements.  The Navy version of the RQ-4B Global Hawk, the MQ-4C 
Triton, uses the same airframe but needs drastically different sensor technology to 
perform its mission.  While the Global Hawk is designed to fly at high altitudes over 
land, the Triton is designed to fly at lower altitudes, where it must consider 
environmental effects such as icing and wind gusts, and it must stare at a constantly 
moving sea surface, which necessitates a sensor package capable of picking out 
every detail against this background.  This required several different component 
(sensor) and architectural (wing and frame) innovations to modify it to naval service 
(GAO, 2009). 
Similarly, the GAO report (2009) pointed to another complaint about 
the development of separate sensors and flight control systems for the Air Force 
Predator and Army Gray Eagle UAVs.  Although the systems are approximately 80% 
common, the Army system was designed to be flown by enlisted operators, whereas 
the Air Force systems are flown by trained pilots (GAO, 2009).  While some cases of 
duplicative development can be called into question, there are many considerations 
that must be made to future downselect efforts that take into account the individual 
needs of the services.  This again points to the importance of lead user feedback 
and a healthy industry capable of innovation. 
Parsons (2013) pointed to a few technological hurdles that must be 
overcome for demand to increase in the maritime robotics sector.  Long-range 
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communications, improved fuel cell technology, and increased levels of autonomy 
capable of object avoidance are all noted as areas critical to further development. 
d. Unclear Legal and Regulatory Regime Governing Usage 
Dew’s (2012) fourth demand-side constraint concerns the unclear legal 
and regulatory regime governing usage.  Almost every report on the UAS industry 
points to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) UAS regulations as the main 
roadblock to proliferation.  Japan already allows civilian UAS usage for certain 
applications, and unmanned helicopters are already being used there for pesticide 
spraying (Harrison, 2013).  
Several government policies inhibit the growth of the unmanned 
systems industry.  One agency most often cited as a barrier to growth is the FAA 
(Harrison, 2013).  A 2012 report by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) on future UAS plans included calls to 
simplify the FAA Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) process.  The FAA, 
with few exceptions, prohibits civilian UAS operation in the nation’s airspace.  
Presumably, opening up airspace for responsible use of UAS would result in 
dramatic increases in market demand. 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (Harrison, 2013) 
stated that the primary reason for the strict regulations is the immaturity of the 
sense, detect, and avoid technology that prevents collisions with other aircraft.  This 
poses a challenge to the industry to innovate in order to thrive. The report also noted 
government export restrictions as a limiting factor on industry growth, since the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) carries a “strong presumption of denial” 
(Harrison, 2013, p. 5) for UAS exports. 
e. Lack of Competition From Disruptive Innovations 
Dew’s (2012) fifth and final demand-side constraint involves the lack of 
competition from disruptive innovations.  As many researchers have highlighted 
(Christensen, 1999; Duysters, 1996; Utterback, 1996), disruptive technologies most 
often come from firms outside the circle of industry leaders.  Throughout history, 
government leaders have sought ways to maintain several prime contractors in 
industries to encourage competition and innovation.  In the current fixed-wing 
military aviation industry, only three prime contractors exist, down from a high of 16 
following WWII (Lorell, 2003).  One of the greatest periods of aviation industry 
innovation occurred in the years following WWII, spurred by intense competition and 
discovery of advanced Luftwaffe designs.  As seen in Appendix B, there are 
currently 31 prime contractors in the DoD unmanned systems industry Figure 11 
shows that there were 37 different companies that received PSC 1550 funds in 2012 
for unmanned systems development and procurement.  The greater number of 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 50 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
competing firms and low barriers to entry make disruptive innovations more likely to 
occur. 
E. FUTURE UNMANNED SYSTEMS MARKET TRENDS 
1. Global Growth 
Although the R&D spent by the DoD has greatly influenced technological 
breakthroughs in the robotics industry, many researchers have identified the 
importance of market influence on innovation. Dew (2012) noted that the DoD needs 
“to be more explicit about the contributions of demand-side strategies toward military 
efficiency and effectiveness, that is, toward the DoD’s explicit security goals” (p. 53).  
The U.S. unmanned systems industry is uniquely poised to take advantage of 
increased market demand, since the technology is already proven and employed 
around the globe. 
DoD leaders are optimistic about maritime unmanned systems, although they 
often do not garner the recognition received by UAVs.  Insinna (2013) noted that 
Lockheed is currently contracted for an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that tows 
mine-hunting sonar equipment.  These UUVs will replace MH-60 helicopters designed 
to tow sonar equipment from the air, resulting in greater cost effectiveness and less 
danger to humans.  Another unmanned surface vehicle will mimic the acoustic 
properties of large ships.  The Navy is depending on advances in autonomy 
technologies to make these unmanned systems possible.  Hull space is a consideration 
in autonomy evolution, since autonomy requires greater computing power, which in turn 
requires more space (Parsons, 2013). 
Parsons (2013) noted that spending on maritime robots is about 8% of that 
spent on UAVs.  He stated that the reliance on commercial off-the-shelf products 
has driven maritime robot costs down.  
The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) is 
optimistic about the economic benefits of unmanned aircraft integration.  According 
to a report by Jenkins and Vasigh (2013), government deregulation of airspace 
would result in an economic impact of $13.6 billion in the first three years.  The 
report stated that the agriculture industry and public safety departments would 
account for approximately 90% of this growth, with the agriculture industry 
accounting for 80% of the total growth alone (see Figure 13).  Tadjdeh (2013b) also 
noted the potential for growth in the subterranean exploration market. 
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Figure 13. UAV Sales Forecast Through 2025  
(Jenkins & Vasigh, 2013) 
Jenkins and Vasigh (2013) pointed out other market areas where UAS 
demand will be highest, such as disaster management, weather monitoring, and 
freight transport among others.  They stated that there are currently over 100 
different suppliers for UAS parts despite the federal restrictions, which portends a 
viable, competitive marketplace.  Jenkins and Vasigh (2013) identified conditions 
upon which their forecast depends, including liability insurance.  Their report 
estimates that every year the FAA delays integration of UAS into the national 
airspace costs the economy $10 billion in lost revenues. 
A study conducted by the Teal Group (Zaloga, Rockwell, & Finnegan, 2012) 
also provided an optimistic view of military budget growth for UAS RDT&E and 
procurement.  The report estimated global spending on UAS RDT&E and 
procurement through FY2022 to reach $89.1 billion.  The report estimates U.S. 
outlays will comprise 62% of the entire global RDT&E expenditures and 55% of 
global procurement expenditures during that time (see Figure 14).  Figure 15, 
another graph from the Teal Group (Zaloga et al., 2012), shows the contribution of 
each global region to the total value of global UAS production, military and civilian.  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 52 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
The U.S. is forecasted to provide the vast majority of production value, with the 
Asia–Pacific region also experiencing significant growth. 
 
Figure 14. Global Military UAS Budget Forecast—R&D and Procurement 
(Zaloga et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 15. Global UAS Production Forecast: Contribution of Each Region to 
Total Value (Value, $ Millions)  
(Zaloga et al., 2012) 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also stands to benefit from 
market growth in the unmanned systems industry.  Like the DoD, the DHS operates 
in the air, on land, and at sea.  The DHS UAS program flew a record 5,700 hours in 
FY2012 (DHS, 2013) and has spent $201.9 million on UAS since FY2006.  This total 
is 15% of the total DHS expenditures on aviation systems during that time frame.  
DHS envisions the development of smartphone control of UAS for use in emergency 
response that could improve real-time damage information gathering (DHS, 2013). 
Other countries are already investing heavily in robotics technology.  China’s 
recent five-year plan established funding for robotics industrial complexes in five 
new geographical areas.  Each geographical area expects $8 billion in incentive 
funding by 2017 (Tobe, 2013). 
Tadjdeh (2013b) quoted a senior defense analyst in the prospects of small-
UAV growth.  Despite the past decade of developments, further evolution of small 
UAVs will be slow.  Environmental effects such as wind and poor weather cause 
havoc on UAV operations and provide opportunities for breakthrough innovations.  
The analyst estimates these roadblocks will “take another decade for the rough 
spots to be smoothed out and real innovation to occur” (p. 1).  
 Likewise, the Navy is currently developing heavyweight class UUVs, 
awarding a contract of $8.4 million to procure large UUVs capable of carrying almost 
any payload (Parsons, 2013).  Increasing attention has been paid to interoperability 
of unmanned systems, with particular focus on interoperability with NATO allies 
(Tadjdeh, 2013a). 
2. Competitor Analysis 
Due to focused development efforts, the U.S. has a lead in unmanned 
systems technology and production.  However, other countries have taken note and 
are beginning to grow their own industries.  Of note are China and Russia, who, 
behind the U.S. rank second and third, respectively, in total annual defense 
spending.  There are very few public records of funding levels to Russian and 
Chinese unmanned systems industry participants; therefore, it is difficult to make 
direct comparisons to the U.S. industry.  However, there is anecdotal evidence that 
suggests that the U.S. unmanned systems technological dominance could be 
challenged in the near future.   
Several recent news reports detail Russia’s efforts to grow its unmanned 
systems industry.  The former commander in chief of Russia’s air forces recently 
announced that design work had begun on a sixth generation unmanned aircraft, 
although experts admit that it will not be ready for at least 15 years (Litovkin, 2013b).  
Russian navy officials have plans to incorporate unmanned submarines and sea 
robotized systems beyond 2020 (Litovkin, 2013a).  Government-funded activities 
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such as the Central Research Institute of Robotics and Technical Cybernetics (RTC) 
in Saint Petersburg, the Saint Petersburg Special Technology Center, and the Robot 
Equipment Laboratory are beginning development on comparable unmanned 
systems with an eye to the civilian market (Kislyakov, 2013).  Established Russian 
aviation companies like Kamov and Sukhoi are developing unmanned rotorcraft and 
fixed-wing aircraft, respectively (Fedutinov, 2013).  Russian and United Arab Emirate 
defense contractors are also teaming up to develop an unmanned combat helicopter 
(Rapoza, 2013). 
China’s advances in robotics technologies are a greater concern to many 
(Moss, 2013).  A U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission report 
(Hsu, 2013) on China’s UAV industry detailed several government enterprises 
tasked with unmanned systems development.  These universities and research 
facilities are receiving government funding increases for unmanned system 
development.   
China has three main R&D centers with university affiliations.  The Beijing 
University of Aeronautics and Astronautics is China’s leading aeronautical university 
and receives state funds to advance R&D in marketable technologies.  Nanjing 
University for Aeronautics and Astronautics receives state funds for R&D in cutting-
edge technologies and has reportedly created China’s first unmanned rotorcraft and 
high-altitude UAV.  Northwest Polytechnic University hosts the Xi’an ASN 
Technology Group, which is China’s largest UAV production company and R&D 
base.  Its primary customer is the People’s Liberation Army (Hsu, 2013). 
Already, some predict a drone race between the U.S. and China.  The 
Defense Science Board (DSB; 2012) task force report on unmanned autonomy 
specifically mentioned China’s progress several times and cited its rise as 
“worrisome” (p. 69): 
In a worrisome trend, China has ramped up research in recent years 
faster than any other country. It displayed its first unmanned system 
model at the Zhuhai air show five years ago, and now every major 
manufacturer for the Chinese military has a research center devoted to 
unmanned systems. (p. 69) 
Although the report (DSB, 2012) acknowledged the lack of funding data for 
Chinese unmanned systems development, it pointed out that unlike the U.S., China 
has no export restrictions on its unmanned systems.  Although China lags behind 
technological development in the U.S. and Europe,  
the military significance of China’s move into unmanned systems is 
alarming. The country has a great deal of technology, seemingly 
unlimited resources and clearly is leveraging all available information 
on Western unmanned systems development. China might easily 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 55 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
match or outpace U.S. spending on unmanned systems, rapidly close 
the technology gaps and become a formidable global competitor in 
unmanned systems. (p. 71) 
Perhaps the most alarming information to come from China’s drone program 
is the much lower price tag on seemingly comparable UAV variants.  The Chinese 
equivalent of the Reaper UAV is estimated to be significantly cheaper than its U.S. 
counterpart, although a comparison of capabilities is unknown.  The prospect of 
cheaper drones and the lack of Chinese export restrictions have attracted some 
African and Asian nations to the Chinese industry (Zhou, 2012).  China is already 
using UAVs for border reconnaissance along the North Korean and Myanmar 
borders (Moss, 2013). 
China is currently developing drones to rival every class of U.S. drone, with 
prototypes resembling the most advanced U.S. UAVs on display at trade shows and 
military exercises (Moss, 2013).  The China Aerospace Science and Industry 
Corporation (CASIC) is China’s largest producer of non-military drones, and it 
expects to see government orders double in the next year due to East China Sea 
island sovereignty disputes (Denslow, 2012).   
The Defense Science Board Report is seen as unnecessarily alarmist by 
some (Moss, 2013), but the message is clear.  The technology gap between the 
U.S. and rival nations is not as distinct as perhaps it once was and could be rapidly 
closed given the mix of policy and market issues that threaten the U.S. industry.  
What is more concerning is “the proliferation to the developing world of armed, 
unmanned systems that China’s low prices, and even lower export barriers, may 
soon begin to drive” (Moss, 2013, p. 3). 
Hsu (2013) pointed to three factors that will facilitate growth in China’s 
unmanned systems industry.  The first is the fact that the People’s Liberation Army 
controls a large majority of China’s airspace, which provides abundant testing 
grounds for both military and civilian UAVs.  The second factor is China’s growing 
satellite constellation, designed as an alternative to the U.S. GPS constellation.  
Hsu’s (2013) third factor is maturation of Chinese support services for UAV 
employment, especially robotics programs like flight control systems and data 
recycling programs. 
The U.S. has benefitted greatly from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
focused development efforts and close interaction between users and producers has 
advanced the state of the art further than ever.  This has been the U.S.’s chief 
advantage over rival nations.  However, the drawdown of combat forces in 
Afghanistan will minimize this focused development to an extent.  The U.S. will still 
employ unmanned systems in the war on global terrorism, but the feedback loop will 
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not be as a compact as it is at the moment.  The U.S. will no longer enjoy this 
advantage over rival nations, which will facilitate closing the technological gap.    
Without adequate public budget records, it is difficult to gauge the maturity of 
our rivals’ unmanned systems industries.  At the moment, it seems U.S investment 
in unmanned systems development is the highest of all nations.  However, the 
amount of funding is sometimes not as important as other factors.  Current 
government policies could irreparably harm U.S. efforts to maintain unmanned 
systems dominance. 
F. CONCLUSION 
We are living in what some might call a golden age of unmanned systems 
technologies.  With the advent of several critical complementary technologies, the 
industry is poised to grow significantly.  Despite the favorable reports of combat 
performance over the past decade, though, there is still much work to be done in 
many technological areas to continue advancing unmanned systems.  Other nations 
have indicated their desire to pursue unmanned systems technologies.  Despite 
enjoying a commanding lead in unmanned system development, the U.S. is at risk of 
losing its dominance in the long run. 
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V. COMPARING THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INDUSTRY WITH 
THE EARLY FIXED-WING AVIATION INDUSTRY AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
The purpose of this comparative analysis is to draw parallels useful for 
informing an acquisition strategy that will ensure the health of the industry and the 
DoD’s technological dominance on the battlefield.  The unmanned systems industry 
is very similar to the early fixed-wing aviation and microelectronics industries on 
many levels and can provide an important comparison for what policy decisions the 
DoD must execute to avoid mistakes in the U.S. robotics industry.  Historical study 
shows that these industries complement, supplement, and reinforce one another and 
can serve as a blueprint for policy decisions in the unmanned systems industry. 
For this comparative analysis, I use the themes discussed in the literature 
review conclusion to compare and contrast each of the historical industry examples 
with the unmanned systems industry.  Using these themes, I point out where 
government intervention helped or harmed the early industries, and how similar 
policies might affect the future of the unmanned systems industry.  
 Point A: Government funding and procurement have been critical in the 
development of key technologies while serving as incubators for infant 
industries.  
This point requires some clarification.  While defense unmanned systems 
applications make up a portion of the U.S. robotics industry output, U.S. robotic 
technology has a strong presence in the manufacturing industry.  The robotics 
industry has also thrived overseas in manufacturing applications.  However, this 
research focuses on the segment of the robotics industry applicable to defense, 
which has recently benefitted from advances in miniaturization, communications, 
and navigation.    
There are many parallels between the early years of the three industries.  In 
all three cases, the earliest market was almost exclusively defense-related.  
Although there were many failures, defense funding resulted in global technological 
dominance of all three industries at some point in their evolution. 
The current unmanned systems industry is remarkably similar to the early 
fixed-wing aviation industry around WWI.  Hostilities overseas created a burgeoning 
defense demand for both industries.  In the fixed-wing aviation industry, civilian 
aircraft production was almost nonexistent until 1924.  Figure 9 shows that for the 
first 10 years of the industry, production was almost completely limited to military 
programs (Pattillo, 2000).  Pattillo (2000) quoted Major General William Lassiter on 
the aviation industry in the 1920s: 
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[The aircraft industry] depends for its existence almost wholly upon 
orders placed by governmental services. … The development of 
commercial aviation will stimulate the aircraft industry, but orders from 
the military services must be depended upon, at least for the 
immediate future, if the industry is to be kept alive. (p. 57) 
The government kept the aviation industry alive but misjudged its importance and 
learned an important lesson when it prematurely withdrew funding before the 
commercial market matured.  The decline in the U.S. aviation industry’s global 
standing proved the importance of government funding to the nascent industry.  
Likewise, in the microelectronics industry, it is important to note the time span 
between the invention of computing devices and commercial proliferation.  Table 1 
shows that the defense market for semiconductor sales comprised over 50% of the 
entire U.S. market in 1960 (Wilson et al., 1980).  This monopsony situation often 
resulted in over specification of products, which advanced the microelectronics 
industry more than it would have in a satisficing market situation.  As Utterback and 
Murray (1977) pointed out, between 1950 and 1970, the largest and fastest growing 
sectors of the electronics market were defense related.  
As with the fixed-wing aviation industry in the 1930s, the unmanned systems 
industry is just now eyeing unprecedented global market demand after decades of 
development.  The high cost of operation in the early decades, combined with limited 
passenger payloads, ensured that fixed-wing aviation made little headway in the 
commercial marketplace.  Likewise, the microelectronics industry was almost 
exclusively defense related in the initial years.  The unmanned systems industry has 
followed this trend.  The reasons for exclusivity differ somewhat, but the high cost of 
end items initially kept manned aircraft, microelectronics, and unmanned systems 
out of the commercial marketplace for years.  Just as the increase in fixed-wing 
aircraft payload led to the ability to carry more passengers, thereby making it more 
cost effective, the increase in UAV payload has made it more cost effective for 
commercial applications.  Just as the decrease in microelectronic prices led to a 
dramatic increase in market demand, the decrease in the price of unmanned 
systems has put it on the brink of significant growth.  However, until this commercial 
demand materialized in each industry, the U.S. government was the primary force 
behind technology evolution in both requirements definition and funding. 
 Point B: While important to technological development, government 
R&D funding has rarely been as important as market demand. 
In all defense industries, increases in R&D usually occur in concert with 
increases in procurement.  With increases in wartime appropriations, the U.S. 
increases its defense budgets, which usually increases both R&D and procurement.  
It is difficult to break out R&D and procurement data in the two historical industries, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 59 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
particularly due to the lack of adequate historical funding detail.  It is also difficult to 
break R&D data out from procurement data in the recent unmanned systems data, 
since the individual program funding detail combines the two categories.  However, 
the levels of defense procurement versus commercial procurement can be used to 
estimate the market demand influences in each industry.    
In the fixed-wing aviation industry, the periods of greatest innovation came 
during periods of conflict.  While the defense department maintained R&D funding to 
the industry almost non-stop throughout its history, the periods of greatest innovation 
came during the largest procurement cycles.  The period of greatest fixed-wing 
aviation innovation occurred in the 1940s and 1950s as WWII and the Cold War 
resulted in the most significant spikes in defense procurement.   
Likewise, in the microelectronics industry, R&D played an important role in 
promoting risk-taking by firms sensing that a technical breakthrough was imminent.  
As Wilson et al. (1980) noted, although larger companies received a majority of 
government R&D funds, smaller companies typically received more procurement 
contracts.  Regulations that governed R&D outlays favored established firms with a 
proven track record, but these regulations did not extend to procurement, where the 
government was allowed to get the best equipment for the job (Wilson et al., 1980).  
The increase in procurement funding to smaller companies increased the probability 
of breakthrough innovation. 
As in the VHSIC study, government R&D designed to leapfrog existing and 
forecasted technologies did not lead to the result desired by the government 
(Naegele, 1989).  It was commercial demand spurred by the prospects of advanced 
computing and the challenge of staying ahead that led to the most significant 
developments.  The commercial market was able to outpace government R&D, as 
some companies’ survival was dependent on remaining at the cutting edge of 
technology.  Likewise, although the DoD first argued for non-proprietary technology 
in RFID systems, it was demand from the commercial sector, particularly Walmart, 
that began the standardization process (Dew, 2006). 
The single biggest impetus for civilian demand in the fixed-wing aviation 
industry was the repeal of government subsidies for airmail in 1930 that pushed 
firms into passenger transport as a way to increase revenues (Lorell, 2003).  The 
commercial focus on larger transport aircraft led to a new era of design that had 
significant crossover effects between civilian and military markets.  Likewise, the 
U.S. UAV industry is waiting for government policy modification that will open the 
industry to the commercial market like never before, exponentially increasing sales 
of end items in the U.S. and worldwide. 
Improvements to communications, fuel cells, and navigation have placed the 
unmanned systems industry at a critical point.  Commercial interest in unmanned 
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systems is beginning to increase dramatically as technology proven on the battlefield 
is adapted to civilian applications.  While the U.S. has maintained unmanned system 
R&D expenditures for over 30 years, the recent spike in procurement due to wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan has advanced the state-of-the-art more than ever, as 
companies attempt to out-innovate competing firms, searching for that program of 
record status.  Program of record is not a standard term but is widely used to denote 
a program that has a valid capability document in JCIDS, is budgeted in the Future 
Years Defense Program, and has gone through a Material Development Decision.  
The promise of commercial demand will continue this trend, although the 
combination of FAA regulations and U.S. government export controls dampens 
market enthusiasm. 
 Point C: Major innovative breakthroughs predominantly come from 
lower tier contractors and smaller companies. 
Utterback’s (1996) research emphasized the role of non-prime contractors in 
the development of innovative breakthroughs.  Research proves this aphorism in all 
three historical industries.   
Birkler et al. (2003) found this to be true in the fixed-wing aviation industry, 
with examples listed in the literature review.  The first powered aircraft was invented 
by bicycle manufacturers.  The eras with the highest numbers of entrants to the 
market witnessed the most intense competition and innovation.  Many of those new 
companies brought with them breakthrough innovations that changed the industry.  
Likewise, the microelectronics industry also saw major innovations come from 
upstarts, especially in the early Silicon Valley years.  Companies like Texas 
Instruments, Fairchild, and Transitron established their presence in the marketplace 
with breakthrough innovations.  Whereas fixed-wing innovations seem to occur most 
frequently in certain eras, the microelectronics industry sees almost constant 
innovation as processing and storage capabilities continually increase.   
Like the two historical industries, unmanned systems breakthrough 
innovations have also originated largely from smaller companies.  The most popular 
UAV design today, the Predator, was created in the garage of Abe Karem (“The 
Dronefather,” 2012).  Likewise, AeroVironment revolutionized the man-portable UAV 
segment with its Pointer UAV, which proved its value in Afghanistan.  Earlier UAVs 
were usually manned aircraft modified to be piloted remotely, carrying traditional 
aircraft design features.  The visionaries able to see beyond those designs came 
from the industry fringe, not from industry leaders.  
As has been shown in this research, a company tends to be less inventive 
and take fewer risks the larger it becomes.  As companies grow larger and go public, 
their responsibility to shareholders leads them to more conservative and incremental 
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development.  Therefore, industry consolidation can have a detrimental effect on 
state-of-the-art evolution. 
 Point D: Lapses in government attention to areas in both industries 
resulted in a loss of U.S. global dominance in those areas. 
In both historical industries, the U.S. was at one time the global leader but 
saw that dominance slip.  While the U.S. is still regarded as dominant in the fixed-
wing aviation industry, it is no longer considered dominant in the microelectronics 
industry, where the majority of development and production has moved to Asia. 
In the fixed-wing aviation industry, the research shows where government 
missteps resulted in industry decline.  Although powered flight was invented in the 
U.S., the lack of government focus on the industry resulted in other nations 
overtaking the U.S. in aviation technology following WWI.  The U.S. had to play 
catch-up in the years prior to WWII, which was aided by the recognition of overseas 
demand and the rise of commercial applications in the 1930s that kept companies 
competitive. 
In contrast, it is difficult to place blame on the government for the decline of 
U.S. dominance in the microelectronics industry.  The increased offshoring of 
semiconductor production combined with the growth of talent pools in Asia gradually 
eroded U.S. technological dominance in microelectronics.  However, the VHSIC 
development history emphasizes the limitations of government.  The government 
assumed that a dedicated development and procurement effort could leapfrog 
existing and forecast technologies but ended up fielding a technologically obsolete 
chip after years of research.  The DoD underestimated the commercial electronics 
industry’s ability to advance the state of the art and ended up in a costly but largely 
ineffective procurement process. 
There is a contrast between the two historical industries that must be 
identified.  The microelectronics industry primarily produces components, while this 
research primarily concerns architectural innovations in the fixed-wing industry.  The 
leaching of microelectronics production overseas is primarily due to lower cost 
structures outside the U.S.  Due to the global proliferation of microelectronics 
technologies, it is difficult to gain a competitive edge in any one area, thus the lack of 
emphasis for production on U.S. soil.  The fixed-wing aviation industry, however, 
benefits from the emphasis on nationalistic political influences and competitive 
advantage that ensure that production remains on U.S. soil.   
The unmanned industry benefits from both situations.  Commercial 
innovations in areas like propulsion systems and human–robot interfaces can be 
easily assimilated into defense architectures, while the DoD focuses on more 
sensitive technologies like sensor and weapon payloads to maintain competitive 
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advantage over adversaries.  Component technology innovations born globally can 
be easily assimilated into unmanned systems architectures, while more sensitive 
technologies born from U.S. R&D can help maintain global dominance.        
The microelectronics industry history must be heeded in the current 
unmanned systems industry.  The U.S. has been the unquestioned leader in 
unmanned systems development and procurement, but the global community is 
catching up.  The rise and fall of U.S. technological dominance in the information 
technology industry can serve as a warning to the unmanned systems industry, 
which is currently threatened by unmanned systems proliferation throughout the 
globe.  As stated in the literature review, the information technology industry, more 
so than the aviation industry, is very reliant on the pull of market demand.  Countries 
such as Japan and Brazil have fewer government restrictions on the employment of 
unmanned systems and have seen their unmanned systems industry begin to grow 
rapidly.  China has also recently invested heavily to develop its robotics industry 
(Tobe, 2013) and intends to be a key player in the industry future. 
A statement by Pattillo (2000) on the status of fixed-wing aviation in 1923 has 
interesting echoes today: “By 1923 there were rising concerns about the lack of 
aviation policy, even as the role of aviation grew, especially in such fields as 
agriculture, forestry photography, and mapping” (p. 57). 
One can easily apply this quote directly to the current unmanned systems 
industry.  Today, there are concerns about the lack of a well-defined unmanned 
systems policy.  FAA flight restrictions, export controls, and legal issues associated 
with unmanned vehicles sharing public spaces with humans all serve to dampen the 
prospects of industry growth and development.  I believe that the next few years will 
be the most critical in determining the future of the U.S. unmanned systems industry, 
if the government can avoid the same lapses in attention that significantly affected 
the two historical industries. 
 Point E: Flexibility in the procurement process can increase lead user 
input and result in more rapid fielding of innovative breakthroughs. 
The fixed-wing aviation and microelectronics industries must be approached 
from different angles when discussing procurement processes.  Whereas fixed-wing 
aviation procurement predominantly involves substantial programs of record where 
the end item is an assembled aircraft, microelectronics procurement consists of 
buying component technologies to be installed in other architectures.  Therefore, it is 
easier to demonstrate flexibility in the microelectronics industry than the fixed-wing 
aviation industry.   
However, the history of fixed-wing aviation is filled with examples of flexibility 
in the procurement process.  The early years are characterized by many variant 
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airframes but low production volumes of any one airframe.  This permitted the 
testing of most variants in an operational environment, where each variant’s pros 
and cons could be most effectively analyzed.  The choice between variants became 
much clearer in the operational environment.  The unmanned systems industry 
today is very similar.  Particular warfighter needs have been addressed with a 
multitude of unmanned system variants, allowing for testing and evaluation in actual 
combat environments with minimal risk to humans.  As the research shows, market 
demands are already being felt, with the cancellation of truck-mounted UAV systems 
in favor of man-portable or runway-launched systems. 
I presented a specific example from the microelectronics industry of how a 
firm persuaded a contracting officer to switch technologies of a Minuteman II 
transistor mid-production.  The relative ease of changing component technology led 
to this recurring often during industry evolution.  Indeed, the procurement process for 
microelectronics had to be flexible, since specific examples show that 
semiconductors developed and procured by the DoD were often inferior to 
commercial products by the time they were fielded.  Likewise, in the unmanned 
systems industry the research shows close collaboration between the warfighter and 
the contractor, such as with the performance-based logistics process.  This 
collaboration allows for quicker industry response to requirement modification, where 
architectural and component changes can be made outside the normal, lengthy 
acquisition channels. 
The unmanned systems industry is rife with examples of unconventional 
procurement processes.  The past decade has resulted in a dramatic shortening of 
the lead user feedback loop, favoring rapid employment over drawn-out procurement 
processes that sacrifice flexibility for efficiency.  As combat operations in 
Afghanistan wind down, the threat is that procurement practices will gradually return 
to the pre-war state, with a focus on exploitation of existing technologies instead of 
exploration for new breakthroughs in an attempt to save money.  The lead user 
feedback loop will inevitably be lengthened, as program justification will have to 
come from higher up the chain of command.   
A summary of the comparative analysis is as follows: While there are obvious 
differences and important contrasts between the three industries, the framework 
suggested above contains enough similarities to adequately compare the early eras 
of fixed-wing aviation and microelectronics and the unmanned systems industry.  
These historical industries can advise policy decisions in the unmanned systems 
industry and serve as a warning to government inattention to what has been 
identified as a critical part of the U.S. defense strategy for the foreseeable future.
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VI. THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP 
VERSUS THE BUDGET 
The first part of this chapter shows overall and individual program unmanned 
systems budget projections through FY2018.  The second part of this chapter details 
technology readiness levels for many key technologies mentioned in the Unmanned 
Systems Integrated Roadmap, which will be referred to as the Roadmap for the 
remainder of the thesis.  I attempt to determine if the DoD’s budget policy is in line 
with its desire to advance unmanned systems technologies. 
The DoD produces the Roadmap every two years.  The Roadmap “describes 
the vision for the joint integration of unmanned systems into the Department and 
identifies steps required to affordably facilitate this integration” (FY2013–2038 
Unmanned Systems, 2013, p. xiii) and “outlines major areas over the next 25 years 
where DoD and industry should focus to ensure the timely and successful adoption 
of unmanned systems technologies” (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013, p. 
xiii).   
A. FUNDING THROUGH 2018  
1. Overall Funding Detail 
Figure 16 shows a relatively stable flow of UAV funding.  Although 
procurement increases from $1.5 billion in 2014 to $2.2 billion in 2018, RDT&E 
declines from $1.2 billion in 2014 to $1.1 billion in 2018.  This trend seems to 
portend an increase in exploitation of existing technology vice further exploration.  
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) cited the forecasted 
worldwide robotics industry growth but stated that although “DoD will not be the bulk 
user within that market” (p. 4), it “does intend to be the most innovative user” (p. 4).  
While the DoD counts on market growth, it seems U.S. government policies like FAA 
restrictions and export regulations will hamper U.S. robotics industry growth, while 
international firms unburdened by U.S. regulations will have better growth 
opportunities. 
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Figure 16. Unmanned Aviation Systems Funding Through FY2018  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
Figure 17 shows unmanned ground systems funding through 2018.  RDT&E 
reaches a peak in 2015 at $19.1 million but drops sharply to $10.6 million by 2018.  
Note that expenditures on unmanned ground systems are a small fraction of that 
spent on unmanned aviation systems.  The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned 
Systems, 2013) stated that this unmanned ground systems support and sustainment 
plan sustains “specific capabilities beyond today’s worldwide engagements to bridge 
the capability gap until enduring capabilities are developed and acquired using 
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Figure 17. Unmanned Ground Systems Funding Through FY2018  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
Figure 18 shows maritime systems funding through 2018.  RDT&E increases 
from $62.8 million in 2014 to $87.2 million in 2018.  While procurement increases 
from 2015 to 2017, FY2018 procurement funding is less than that in 2014.  The 
Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) predicted that “as new littoral 
combat ships arrive in service, support unmanned maritime systems (UMS) will rise 
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Figure 18. Unmanned Maritime Systems Funding Through FY2018  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
Figure 19 shows DoD unmanned systems funding as a percentage of total 
DoD funding FY2014 through 2018.  Although labeled as a priority for the DoD, total 
unmanned systems funding is not projected to make up more than 1% of the total 
DoD budget through 2018. 
 
Figure 19. DoD Unmanned Systems Funding as a Percentage of  
Total DoD Funding  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
To put the unmanned systems budget in perspective, Figure 20 shows Air 
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2015, funding for the JSF is more than twice that for all unmanned systems, and 
FY2018 JSF funding is almost three times that of unmanned systems. 
 
Figure 20. JSF Funding as a Percentage of Total DoD Funding  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Although funding for unmanned systems seems relatively healthy and stable, 
it still represents a small fraction of total DoD funding.  Total unmanned systems 
spending seems smaller still when compared to funding for large DoD programs of 
record.  
2. Individual Program Funding Detail 
The previous three figures provided information about funding for the 
unmanned systems industry as a whole but did not provide much detail as to how 
the money was spent.  Therefore, I am including data from IHS Aerospace, Defense, 
& Maritime’s (2013) IHS Jane’s Budget Analysis for FY14, which displays each 
service’s activity priority list and budget forecast through 2018.  Budget information 
from 2011 is included in each chart to show recent trends.  The monetary value for 
each service program includes that program’s RDT&E and procurement budget.  
The values in the y-axis are in millions of then-year dollars.  Individual system 
budget data are available for programs of record.  Systems that are not yet 
programs of record, such as the K-Max unmanned cargo helicopter, are 
consolidated into other funding categories, such as Science & Technology (S&T). 
The Individual Program Funding Detail does not include off-platform 
operations and maintenance (O&M) costs; therefore, it is only a partial picture of 
total funding requirements for unmanned systems.  Data are not yet available to 
show the full operations and maintenance costs to the DoD for each program.  
Immaturity in technologies such as autonomy and communications keep these O&M 
costs higher than desired.  Only with technology maturation will these O&M costs 
decrease. 
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Figure 21 shows budget forecasts for the RQ-4 Global Hawk/Triton Program.  
The RQ-4 is the most expensive unmanned system per copy in the DoD inventory.  
While funds increase for the Naval variant, funds for the Air Force variant drop 
sharply, with an overall decrease in funding for both programs between 2011 and 
2018.  Naval variant funding fluctuates erratically through 2018.   
 
Figure 21. FY2011–2018 Budget for RQ-4 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Figure 22 shows forecasted funding for the General Atomics MQ-1/MQ-9 
variants.  While decreasing from highs in 2012, funding roughly stabilizes through 
2018.  Air Force funding remains stable through 2018, but Army variant funding 
almost zeroes out after 2016.  Also important to note is that the MQ-9 is a larger and 
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Figure 22. FY2011–2018 Budget for MQ-1/MQ-9 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Figure 24 and Figure 23 show funding for the Navy UCAV and UCLASS.  The 
UCAV is a technology demonstrator; therefore, funding will taper off by 2015.  The 
UCLASS will see increases in funding to 2016, and funding will stabilize into the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Figure 23. FY2011–2018 Budget for UCAV UAV  
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Figure 24. FY2011–2018 Budget for UCLASS UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for the RQ-7 Shadow is shown in Figure 25.  Funding declined 
rapidly from 2011 but stabilizes from 2012 on, as the Shadow is a program of record 
and will continue to be procured by the Army through 2018. 
 
Figure 25. FY2011–2018 Budget for RQ-7 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for the MQ-8B Fire Scout will increase in 2016 but will sharply 
decline thereafter, as shown in Figure 26.  The MQ-8 is an unmanned rotorcraft 











































dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 73 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
 
Figure 26. FY2011–2018 Budget for MQ-8 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
From a high of more than $90 million in 2012, funding for the RQ-11 Raven 
declines to less than one-fourth of the 2012 value by 2018, as seen in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. FY2011–2018 Budget for RQ-11 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for the MQ-5 Hunter slowly declines to almost one-third of the 2011 
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Figure 28. FY2011–2018 Budget for MQ-5 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for the AeroVironment Endurance UAV variants declines sharply 
from $165.9 million in 2011 to zero in 2016, but the Army funding value for 2018 is a 
nominal $100 million, as seen in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. FY2011–2018 Budget for Endurance UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for the RQ-21 STUAS/STUASLO gradually increases and stabilizes 
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Figure 30. FY2011–2018 Budget for RQ-21 UAV  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Funding for target drone development and procurement remains relatively 
stable through 2018, as seen in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. FY2011–2018 Budget for Target UAVs  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
DoD funding for the common development of UAS systems sharply declines 
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Figure 32. FY2011–2018 Budget for DoD Common UAS Development UAV 
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
The Army and Navy both list a General UAS Funding category in their 
budgets, with Navy funding cut off past 2012 and Army funding ending in 2014, as 
seen in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. FY2011–2018 Budget for General UAV Funding  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
DoD funding for the Joint Robotics Program ends in 2013 and zeroes out 
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Figure 34. FY2011–2018 Budget for Joint Robotics Program  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Navy EOD robotics funding, as seen in Figure 35, is one of the few programs 
that sees an increase in funding, although the dollar value remains relatively small. 
 
Figure 35. FY2011–2018 Budget for Navy EOD Robotics  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Figure 36 shows funding for anti-submarine warfare targets, which are 
unmanned underwater vehicles used to simulate enemy submarines.  Funding is 
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Figure 36. FY2011–2018 Budget for Anti-Submarine Warfare Targets  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
The following two graphs, Figure 37 and Figure 38, show funding for sensor 
technologies incorporated on unmanned systems.  Both show spikes in funding 
followed by sharp declines. 
 
Figure 37. FY2011–2018 Budget for Wide Area Surveillance  
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Figure 38. FY2011–2018 Budget for Family of Persistent  
Surveillance Capabilities  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Although declining sharply in 2014, funding for the Rapid Technology 
Transition Program increases through 2016, then stabilizes, as shown in Figure 39.  
Again, these data are not exclusive to unmanned systems technologies. 
 
Figure 39. FY2011–2018 Budget for Rapid Technology Transition Program 
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Figure 40 shows the rise in JUON funding through 2014, followed by a stable 
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the acknowledged importance of the JUON process, which shortens the lead user 
feedback loop and gets desired technologies to the field faster. 
 
Figure 40. FY2011–2018 Budget for JUON Funding  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013) 
Overall, individual activity budget data are consistent with the Roadmap 
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) funding information, but this research 
draws an important conclusion from the data.  Funding for the major programs, like 
the MQ-4, MQ-1, MQ-9, and UCLASS, remains substantial but is in decline.  
Funding for the largest programs is going to established contractors Northrop 
Grumman (MQ-4) and General Atomics (MQ-1 and MQ-9), while the UCLASS is 
currently being bid by Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and General 
Atomics.  Smaller programs and smaller companies, like the RQ-7 (AAI, Inc.) and 
RQ-11 (AeroVironment), and companies that develop the less-touted ground and 
maritime systems generally see greater declines in funding and less-stable cash 
flows, with a few exceptions.  This trend is indicative of the DoD’s desire to narrow 
down on technologies to achieve efficiencies. 
These data seem to indicate that the DoD has chosen dominant designs that 
will see further development and procurement at the expense of other systems.  The 
Global Hawk and Predator-type designs are receiving the majority of funding, while 
the UCLASS program will eventually determine the dominant carrier-based design.  
It is difficult to determine where on the technology S-curve these architectures fall, 
but given the immaturity of the industry the DoD could be at risk of putting most of its 
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B. TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL OVERVIEW 
In order to show the immaturity of key unmanned systems technologies, I 
consulted the Independent Research and Development (IR&D) database provided 
by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).  I received a data set filtered 
for all entries associated with the term “unmanned.”  It is important to note that some 
of the technologies are proprietary and cannot be fully divulged, so I have tried to be 
as generic as possible describing the technology area.  Also, the TRL value is where 
the technology is expected to be at the end of the current development phase, which 
means that most of the technologies are not yet at that level.  One major limitation of 
the database is that there is no estimation of how much time it will take to get the 
technology to that level or beyond.  Another limitation is the chance that not all 
critical technologies are depicted in the database due to sensitivity concerns.  For 
more information on TRL ratings and descriptions, refer to Appendix A.    
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) divided unmanned 
systems technologies into nine major categories and expounds on five of those.  I 
too have broken out those five categories and included pertinent information.  I 
combined all other TRLs into the final table. 
1. Interoperability and Modularity 
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) defined 
interoperability as “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned 
tasks” (p. 31) with the ability to “provide data, information, material, and services to 
and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces … and to use the 
exchanged data, information, material, and services to enable them to operate 
effectively together” (p. 31).  DoD policy states that systems employed by the DoD 
shall be interoperable with joint, combined, coalition, and other government agencies 
as appropriate (DoD, 2007).  Rapid procurement methods used in the past decade 
for unmanned systems have not always adhered to this requirement, due to the 
urgency of need in battle.  As combat operations in Afghanistan conclude, there will 
be a greater effort at ensuring interoperability at program onset.  Figure 41 is the 
OSD interoperability roadmap. 
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Figure 41. Interoperability and Modularity Roadmap  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
Table 2 displays information about unmanned systems interoperability and 
modularity TRLs. 
Table 2. Interoperability Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 20131) 
Technology Summary TRL 
Look beyond existing technologies and manned/unmanned platform 
modernization plans to examine how future capabilities can provide 
increased performance, affordability, and relevance. 
2 
Develop a family of platform agnostic UAS products to enhance 
Command and Control and Mission Management market segments 
2 
Identify the key risk areas of the RMMV (Remote Multi-Mission 
Vehicle) operation with LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) 
3 
Integrate and demonstrate a Multi-Intelligence UAS mission solution to 
include sensors on both Sentry and Neptune Air Vehicles. 
3 
Integrate hardware/software architecture to support unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) missions with varying levels of autonomy 
4 
As Table 2 shows, unmanned systems interoperability technologies are 
immature and will need time and effort to advance them, as well as possibly 
retrofitting existing unmanned systems as the technology matures. 
2. Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience 
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) combined 
“availability of communications link, the amount of data that the communications 
links support, obtaining spectrum assignments, and the resilience of all RF 
subsystems against interference” (p. 39) into this category.  The Roadmap 
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) identified several issues with the current 
                                            
1 Mr. J. W. Smith, chief of the DTIC Information Collection Division, provided an unclassified data set 
for current program TRLs via email on September 9, 2013. 
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infrastructure: poor global connectivity, costly satellite/network contracts, stovepipe 
infrastructures, and poor information sharing.  Unmanned systems will be vigorously 
competing with commercial systems for broadband in the foreseeable future and 
must also be able to withstand electromagnetic attacks in more contested airspace 
than encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Figure 42 is the capability roadmap.  
 
Figure 42. Communications, Networks, and Electromagnetic  
Systems Roadmap  
(FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) 
Table 3 shows the TRLs for communications systems from the IR&D 
database I received.  This category had the highest concentration of immature 
technology.  Many of the technologies deal with low observability and survivability in 
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Table 3. Communications Systems Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
New prototype and production radar systems testing (further 
information withheld) 
1 
Identify and develop the core technologies for enabling miniaturized 
Free Space Optical Communications systems capable of scaling 
across data rates, distances, and platforms and integrating with radio 
frequency systems for adjunct capabilities. 
2 
A solution that allows the UAS to maneuver to maintain safe 
separation from other threat aircraft, which relies on less restrictive 
separation distances than conflict avoidance 
2 
Develop a low cost, compact, and lightweight electronically steerable 
antenna for Ka SATCOM in unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). 
2 
Advance objectives in the use of natural language processing 
algorithms to produce inductive reasoning in task-commanded robots 
2 
High data rate for SATCOM beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) manned and 
unmanned aircraft operating with small antennas and/or low profile low 
observable antennas 
2 
Enhanced Global Observer system reliability, airworthiness, and flight 
safety 
2 
Analyze and develop Counter-UAS tracking and intercept algorithms, 
understanding system capabilities and limitations for specific use in C-
UAS mission scenarios 
2 
Predicting and optimizing performance of a maritime data link with a 
low freeboard node 
3 
Ability for robots to build maps without emitting energy 3 
Circular Array Antenna (electronically steered directional Ku-band 
circularly polarized antenna offering electronic steering with no moving 
parts in a design that is low cost, low profile, and compact) 
3 
Techniques to counteract jamming, spoofing, and detection 3 
Expand the capabilities of the Wideband Relay System 3 
Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) Receiver Exciter Processor 
enhancements for shipboard UAV operations 
3 
Wideband analog pre-processor for spatial multiplexing 3 
Techniques for controlling underwater autonomous devices from long 
stand-off range 
3 
On-Demand Medium Area Surveillance (O-DMAS) sensors for UAVs 4 
Robust navigation capability for autonomous ship-based landing and 4 
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Technology Summary TRL 
recovery in GPS-denied environment 
Small form factor radio frequency countermeasures hardware, 
software, and firmware 
4 
Algorithms and Pilot Displays to aid in adding to the UAV pilot’s 
situational awareness 
4 
Modern smart phone technology able to control military systems 4 
Highly automated data exploitation 5 
Wide-area motion imagery exploitation capabilities 5 
Signals intelligence geo-location capability that will fit on small UAS 5 
Leveraging ground cellular infrastructure to provide low-cost aircraft to 
ground broadband connectivity 
5 
Multi-channel, phase coherent, direction-finding radio frequency 
sensors deployable on UAS capable of prosecuting multiple signal 
types. 
5 
Architecture artifacts that enable civil and military UAS integration in 
the national airspace system, concentrating primarily on data sharing 
6 
Remotely piloted vehicle control of UAVs by airborne assets 6 
Improved algorithms and techniques for autonomous control of groups 
of unmanned marine vehicles 
6 
Capability upgrades to helicopter and UAS data link 6 
Adapting a digitally fused sensor system to a UAV platform 7 
3. Security 
News reports of UAVs being hijacked by adversaries emphasize the need for 
increased security measures.  The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 
2013) stated that the “emphasis has shifted from protecting system-organic 
technologies and information to a more comprehensive methodology: a platform 
agnostic, sensor-specific approach to address program protection across multiple 
systems and platforms” (p. 58).  The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 
2013) also stated that “anti-tamper is also more cost effective when implemented at 
program onset” (p. 58), which could present a barrier to smaller companies at the 
onset. 
As shown in Table 4, security technologies found in the IR&D database are 
still immature.  The first TRL listed, “develop resilient system to cyber, jamming, and 
physical attacks,” is still at level 2, emphasizing the time, effort, and funding still 
needed to advance this very immature technology. 
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Table 4. Security Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
Develop resilient system to cyber, jamming, and physical attacks 2 
Develop Anti-Jam/EW Antenna Array processing algorithms for low-
SWAP UAVs 
2 
Capability in the field of transmission security (TRANSEC) and 
cryptography for space and  high altitude persistent loitering asset 
applications 
3 
Mitigation of malware code threat to unmanned systems 3 
Fiber optics that provide electro-magnetic interference (EMI) protection 
against energy weapon attacks and against faster bus architectures 
3 
Low radar cross section anti-electronic warfare UAV antenna 5 
4. Persistent Resilience 
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) defined 
persistence as “the continuance of an effect” (p. 62) and resilience as “the ability for 
an application system, or subsystem to react to problems in one of its components 
and still provide the best possible service” (p. 62).  The DoD is constantly searching 
for “efficient solutions to the demand for improved propulsion and power plants” 
(FY2011–2036 Unmanned Systems, 2011, p. 29).  The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 
Unmanned Systems, 2013) broke this category into five subcategories:  
 Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling 
 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
 Survivability 
 Structures and Material Degradation 
 Propulsion 
Table 5 contains TRLs for persistent resilience technologies.  Technologies in 
this category are on average more mature than other categories, but the potential for 
breakthrough innovations, such as improved fuel cells or advanced materials, means 
this category could be in a state of constant flux. 
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Table 5. Persistent Resilience Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
Advanced military propulsion systems and enabling technologies 
concentrating on subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic systems, 
including land- and sea-based vehicles 
1 
Identify improvement in the Thermal Management System (TMS) 
required to meet payload bay ambient requirements 
2 
Supercritical fuel injection 3 
Advanced propulsion and auxiliary power generation technologies 3 
Component and materials technologies directed at enhancing the 
Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engine (VAATE) 
4 
Derivative and new centerline advanced technology engine candidates 
for near-term rotorcraft applications, and advanced propulsion 
technologies that meet future UAV and rotorcraft propulsion system 
requirements 
4 
Heavy fuel/multi-fuel high power density engines 5 
Unmanned undersea system cryogenic storage and delivery system 
for hydrogen and oxygen fuel cell reactants 
5 
Centerline advanced technology engine candidates for near-term 
rotorcraft applications, and advanced propulsion technologies that 
meet future UAV and rotorcraft propulsion system requirements 
6 
5. Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior 
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) highlighted 
autonomy as one of the most critical areas for development.  Autonomy is listed as 
one of the seven science and technology emphasis areas by the DoD Research and 
Engineering Enterprise.  As stated in the introduction, unmanned aircraft are much 
cheaper than the manned airframes they are designed to replace, but the manpower 
requirements are not necessarily fewer.  Increased autonomy will decrease 
manpower requirements, thereby decreasing the overall cost of unmanned 
programs.  The 2011 Roadmap defined autonomy as follows: “self-steering or self-
regulating and is able to follow an externally given path while compensating for small 
deviations caused by external disturbances” (FY2011–2036 Unmanned Systems, 
2011, p. 43).  An autonomous system is “able to make a decision based on a set of 
rules and/or limitations” (FY2011–2036 Unmanned Systems, 2011, p. 43) and “is 
able to determine what information is important in making a decision” (FY2011–2036 
Unmanned Systems, 2011, p. 43).  The updated Roadmap (FY2013–2038 
Unmanned Systems, 2013) focused on mission performance rather than mission 
execution, where execution is the accomplishment of a preprogrammed plan, 
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whereas performance is “associated with mission outcomes that can vary even 
during a mission and require deviation from preprogrammed tasks” (pp. 67–68).  
Figure 43 is from the 2011 Roadmap and was not updated in the 2013 Roadmap. 
 
Figure 43. Autonomy Roadmap  
(FY2011–2036 Unmanned Systems, 2011) 
Table 6 shows TRLs for autonomy technologies in the IR&D database.  Like 
the communications category, autonomy has one of the highest concentrations of 
immature technologies.  The second technology listed provides the overall status of 
autonomy efforts and shows that one of the highest profile technologies is still very 
immature and will require time and resources to advance. 
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Table 6. Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
Autonomous Systems Pathfinder initiative to develop a next-generation 
urban unmanned aerial system 
1 
Creation of effective perception systems for robots and unmanned 
vehicles, which is based on the representation that unifies real-world 
perceptual and conceptual information on a single basis, and this 
allows for their processing on a single basis in real time 
2 
Autonomous robot navigation and manipulation technology to enable 
robot to retrieve objects of interest 
2 
Develop flexibly autonomous systems with certifiable trust through 
verification and validation 
2 
Real-time computation of contingency aircraft trajectories 3 
Scalable Autonomy Sensors that integrate heterogeneous sensors to 
provide autonomy for a robotic platform 
3 
Adaptive control 3 
Addressing autonomy capability gaps in the context of an anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) scenario 
3 
Algorithms and software that span real-time depth from stereo 
imagery, structured light exploitation, simultaneous localization and 
mapping (SLAM) 
3 
Common, verified and validated, certifiable algorithms for collaborative 
control of autonomous vehicles 
4 
Undersea robotics in support of mine warfare and other undersea 
warfare missions 
5 
UAS integration technologies that support covert UAS missions 6 
Autonomous underwater vehicles that are capable of performing both 
inspection missions and operations in deep water 
7 
6. Weaponry 
Table 7 shows TRL levels for weapons technologies.  The focus of weaponry 
for unmanned systems is the effectiveness to weight ratio, since the munitions must 
be light enough to be carried on small unmanned systems.  The Roadmap (FY2013–
2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) emphasized that no current weapon system was 
designed to be employed from unmanned systems.  The DoD will also focus on 
development of unmanned systems as weapons themselves, particularly for the 
suppression of enemy air defenses. 
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Table 7. Weaponry Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
Weapon system characteristics and capabilities required by next-
generation aircraft platforms such as the UCAV 
1 
Determine feasibility of laser designation/illumination pointing 
accuracy from a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform 
2 
Directed energy laser for self-protection purposes 3 
High-Energy Laser (HEL) weapon system 3 
Enhanced energetics and ordnance for incorporation in small 
munitions (primarily UAV based) 
4 
7. Other Unmanned System TRLs 
Table 8 depicts TRLs for technologies in the IR&D database that did not 
clearly fit into one of the above categories.  This table contains TRLs for some of the 
lower priority categories, such as sensor air drop and weather sensing, and TRLs for 
specific systems.   
Table 8. Other Unmanned Systems Technology Summary  
(J. W. Smith, personal communication, September 9, 2013) 
Technology Summary TRL 
A flexible approach for use by both military and civilian organizations to 
assess the hostile intent of red UAS 
1 
A study for potential commercial market opportunities for an airborne 
ISR system 
1 
Approaches to re-architect Global Hawk operations and support 
concepts that reduce costs yet maintain mission effectiveness 
1 
Capability to precisely place and sense and retrieve sensor packages 2 
Assess suitability of Cobra unmanned vehicle for the Littoral Combat 
Ship Unmanned Surface Vehicle mission. 
2 
Perform mishap and incident investigations and apply corrective 
actions on available air vehicles 
2 
System Safety, Safety Critical Validation & Verification planning and 
execution, and other airworthiness tasks supporting certification of the 
Global Observer UAS 
2 
Further development of the VTOL SUAS to satisfy anticipated 
customer requirements 
2 
Provide early warning of dangerous chemical, biological, radiological, 2 
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Technology Summary TRL 
nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) plumes, to identify them, 
and to map/track them 
Advance the technology readiness level of a very compact low power 
microprocessor design 
3 
Estimate the external wind velocity on a vehicle, and thus things like 
true air speed, angle of attack, and slide slip, without having dedicated 
air data sensors such as probes 
3 
Combine above water and below water sensor data to generate a 3D 
perception map of the world around the target platform 
3 
MURAL (Manned Unmanned Resupply Aerial Lifter) and other 
optionally piloted rotorcraft capabilities 
3 
Design and development of a Global Hawk generic payload pod 3 
Bonded structures and joining concepts for future DoD composite 
airframes 
4 
Advanced control surfaces 4 
Nanoparticle technology for advanced materials 5 
Additive fine line metallization of flex circuit technology 6 
New low-cost, light-weight, mini-pod for UAS payloads 6 
Bi-phasic (capable of maneuvering in air and water) unmanned vehicle 6 
Improving Cargo UAS to more effectively augment ground and air 
logistics operations 
6 
Unmanned robotic platform for carrying soldiers’ mission-essential 
equipment 
7 
C. DOMINANT DESIGNS IN THE CURRENT INDUSTRY 
The data suggest that the DoD has identified at least two dominant 
architectural designs in the unmanned systems industry, both in the UAV sector.  
The RQ-4 Global Hawk/MQ-4 Triton and MQ-1 Predator/MQ-9 Reaper 
configurations are being adapted to various missions and receive the majority of 
funding for unmanned systems development and procurement.  The DoD is in the 
process of selecting a design for the UCLASS carrier-based UAV, which will receive 
billions of dollars of funding for R&D and procurement over the next few years. 
The dominant design of an unmanned system has relatively few 
characteristics.  Unmanned architectures require the ability to be securely controlled 
remotely, a propulsion system, and payload capability for sensors, weapons, or 
robotic systems.  UAVs also add the requirements of a lift-producing wing and 
launch and recovery capability.  If the dominant design has been attained, the 
process switches from exploration of alternatives to exploitation of the chosen 
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design.  As noted in the literature review, this has very important ramifications to the 
continued evolution of the industry. 
Given the immaturity of the industry, it is difficult to argue that the Global 
Hawk and Predator architectures are dominant designs.  It is critical that unmanned 
systems be more cost effective than comparable manned designs, and this point is 
of greatest concern.   
The most recent Program Acquisition Unit Costs (PAUC) of the Global Hawk 
and Predator architectures are depicted in Table 9.  These values are provided in 
Selected Acquisition Reports to quantify cost per copy and provide a baseline for 
cost growth comparison.  The PAUC is computed by dividing the Program 
Acquisition Cost by the Program Acquisition Quantity. Program Acquisition Cost is 
the sum of RDT&E, procurement, and unique military construction costs.  The 
program acquisition quantity is the total procurement quantity plus RDT&E 
prototypes that are used for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation.  PAUC is not a 
perfect measure for airframe cost comparison since it does not take into account 
some life-cycle costs that provide better measures of affordability.  However, PAUC 
is the clearest and least manipulable estimate for weapon system cost.  To better 
account for program O&S costs, Table 9also depicts cost per flying hour for each 
airframe.  
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Table 9. Cost per Copy of Selected UAVs From December 2012 Selected 
Acquisition Reports  
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, 2013; Oestergaard, 2013; Shalal-Esa, 2013; Vitasek et al., 2006) 
All Values in FY2014 Dollars 
Variant PAUC Cost Per Flying 
Hour 
MQ-1B Predator $15.1 million $3,242 
MQ-9 Reaper $30.8 million $4,762 estimated 
RQ-4A/B Global Hawk $214.5 million $18,900 estimated 
MQ-4C Triton $189.4 million N/A 
For comparison, the following data are provided: 
RQ-7 Shadow UAV $764,000 $366 estimated 
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet $105.7 million $16,000 estimated 
AV-8B Harrier $37.15 million $11,134 
For comparison, the most recent PAUCs and estimated costs per flying hour 
for the RQ-7 Shadow, F/A-18E/F, and AV-8B Harrier are included.  The MQ-4C 
Triton is still in development; therefore, reliable cost per flying hour data do not yet 
exist.  Of note, a recent report (Shalal-Esa, 2013) stated that the RQ-4 Global Hawk 
cost per flying hour has dropped more than 50% since 2010 due to increased usage 
and improvements in contractor logistics support.   
The PAUC provides an estimate of acquisition cost per system, while the cost 
per flying hour is an estimate of the cost to employ the system.  The cost for the 
Predator variants is comparable to legacy airframes like the AV-8B Harrier, while 
Global Hawk variants are comparable to some of the most sophisticated manned 
aircraft.  Even the highly successful Shadow UAV costs over $750,000 per copy, 
although its cost per flight hour is significantly lower than the other UAVs’.  These 
airframes could hardly be considered expendable, especially in the current fiscal 
climate. 
Figure 44 depicts funding for the three largest UAV programs as a percentage 
of total unmanned systems funding from FY2014 through FY2018.  Data for the 
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three UAV programs come from the IHS Jane’s Budget Analysis (IHS Aerospace,  
Defence, & Maritime, 2013), and these data are compared to total unmanned 
systems budget data from the 2013 Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 
2013).  In FY2014, funding to the three largest UAV programs will be almost 50% of 
total unmanned systems funding.  After FY2014, this percentage increases to over 
50% and continues to grow through FY2018.  Importantly, the funding information for 
the three UAV programs does not include O&M cost forecasts, which would increase 
their percentage of total unmanned systems funding.  O&M costs are included in the 
Funding for other UAV Programs and Total Non-UAV Unmanned System Funding 
categories. 
 
Figure 44. Funding for Select UAV Programs as a Percentage of Total 
Unmanned Systems Funding FY2014–2018  
(IHS Aerospace, Defense, & Maritime, 2013; FY2013–2038 Unmanned 
Systems, 2013) 
The data show that over 50% of total unmanned systems funding through 
FY2018 will go to three prime contractors: General Atomics, Northrop Grumman, 
and the yet-to-be-named producer of the UCLASS.  This trend will hasten industry 
consolidation and likely decrease competition and innovation in the UAV industry. 
The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) emphasized the 
importance of innovation to the unmanned systems industry, stating, 
In particular, the ability of unmanned assets to take risks that would not 
be taken with manned assets opens up new CONOPS, such as low-
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other words, a fleet of low-cost, disposable platforms could survive 
through attrition rather than through expensive, exquisite capabilities. 
(pp. 18–19) 
Likewise, the DoD vision for unmanned systems is the fielding of “affordable, 
interoperable, integrated, and technologically advanced” (FY2013–2038 Unmanned 
Systems, 2013, p. 1) capabilities.  While the three major UAV programs are certainly 
technologically advanced, they are definitely not low cost or expendable.  The 
increase in funding to the three large UAV programs means a decreasing share of 
funding for exploration of low-cost, expendable designs that will constitute the future 
force.  The Roadmap (FY2013–2038 Unmanned Systems, 2013) discussed the 
potential of the civilian market to drive innovation for small unmanned systems 
development, but U.S. government policies might mean that this innovation takes 
place overseas, not here on U.S. soil. 
D. THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP VERSUS THE 
BUDGET CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The DoD has emphasized the importance of the unmanned systems industry 
to national security, and budget information confirms the DoD’s intent.  While the 
DoD will significantly cut funding to many programs, funding for unmanned systems 
R&D and procurement remains relatively healthy, although in general decline.  The 
quantity of funding to the unmanned systems industry is critical, but more important 
is how the DoD will spend the resources.  Will the spending be focused on larger 
companies exploiting current technologies, or will the DoD continue to distribute the 
funds among many players in the interest of fostering continued innovation and 
competition?  Exploitation of existing technologies could bring costs down in the 
short term but could result in the fielding of technologically obsolete systems in the 
face of exponential global industry growth where market forces mature current 
technologies and provide disruptive innovations that revolutionize the industry.   
The immaturity of many unmanned systems technologies is a significant 
concern at this point.  Although unmanned systems have performed well in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, they benefitted from a low denial threat.  In order for unmanned 
systems to be used in more contested environments, or to decrease unmanned 
system costs and manpower requirements, there are huge technology gaps that 
must be closed.  Although most unmanned systems are cheaper per copy than 
manned systems they are designed to replace, manpower requirements are typically 
not fewer, which keeps operations and maintenance costs high.  In order to realize 
greater cost effectiveness, the DoD will have to make huge leaps in autonomy and 
persistent resilience technologies, which are still immature.     
The fact that over 50% of total unmanned system funding is going to only 
three programs is alarming, considering the DoD emphasis on innovation and 
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expendability.  The data show that the DoD is already narrowing down on select 
technologies at the expense of exploration.  The share of the fiscal pie available for 
exploration and development of breakthrough architectural technologies is 
decreasing each year.  The growth potential of the civilian unmanned systems 
market is clear, but regulatory policies threaten industry health while DoD funding 
continues to decline.  
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
U.S. intervention in Afghanistan will draw to a close in the near future.  The 
U.S. government has already factored the drawdown into future budget 
assessments, and there will be increased pressure to cut spending across the 
board, especially in the DoD.  Efforts to achieve commonality and efficiencies, such 
as with the JSF, could reduce innovation and competition in the fledgling unmanned 
systems industry.  It is dangerous to juxtapose the current unmanned systems 
industry and the current fixed-wing aviation industry in arguments for industry 
consolidation, since the industries are at very different levels of overall technological 
maturity. 
The data in the Individual Program Funding Detail section indicate that 
narrowing down on certain designs is already in progress, especially in the UAV 
sector.  However, given the immaturity of the robotics industry, the research 
suggests this narrowing down comes at great risk.  Admittedly, the desire to 
incorporate stealth technology and other expensive initiatives requires the selection 
of few designs at the expense of others, but tying up funds with certain programs 
reduces the chance that the DoD is able to realize the next disruptive innovation.  
The most revolutionary design in UAV architecture was built in an inventor’s garage, 
and given the infancy of the industry, there will likely be more innovative 
breakthroughs. 
The research shows that the U.S. unmanned systems industry is as healthy 
now as it has ever been, with more firms receiving the highest level of funding in 
history.  The prospects of commercial demand are very appealing and indicate a 
possible shift of responsibility for maturation from the DoD to the commercial market.  
However, there are still significant barriers to this commercialization; therefore, it is 
imperative that the DoD not relinquish responsibility for development too early, lest it 
fall on a still immature industry burdened by U.S. government policies that will harm 
the industry for years to come.  I believe that the current unmanned systems industry 
resembles the fixed-wing aviation industry at the Armistice, where decisions the 
government makes post-conflict will have critical and far-reaching effects on the U. 
S. unmanned systems industry.  
Although the civilian market demand for unmanned systems will continue to 
grow, certain sectors will still be limited to DoD research, including stealth 
technology and weapons system employment.  The DoD will ignore research in 
unmanned systems at its own peril.  As the DoD withdraws combat forces from 
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Afghanistan, U.S. unmanned systems testing will shift from the defense sector to the 
commercial sector.  The locus of learning will shift, and DoD learning will be indirect 
rather than direct.    
This research shows that overall funding for unmanned systems R&D and 
procurement is relatively stable, and budget forecasts through 2018 are healthy 
despite impending cutbacks.  However, total annual funding for unmanned systems 
is still a fraction of the total funding for large programs like the JSF over the next five 
years.  Given the relatively small percentage of funding, how the DoD spends 
resources will be critical.  Over 50% of total unmanned systems funds will be locked 
up in three programs for the next five years.  Locking funds into long-term, costly 
programs can result in failing to identify and explore breakthrough technologies that 
revolutionize the industry.  The global commercial industry is now realizing 
unprecedented demand.  Similar to the VHSIC vignette, if the DoD locks itself into 
drawn-out programs, it could be fielding obsolete technology while the commercial 
market or rival nations outpace it.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Given the immaturity of the industry, the DoD should increase funding to 
unmanned systems development and procurement, focusing more on exploration 
and RDT&E until U.S. government policies that inhibit civilian market growth are 
mitigated.  The DoD should closely examine its policy of narrowing down on few 
designs, which consumes resources that could be spent on identifying breakthrough 
technologies. 
In this era of budget crises and military drawdowns, the call to increase 
funding to a particular area will almost certainly induce eye-rolling.  However, I base 
this conclusion on the following factors: 
 Unmanned systems are the future, and the DoD must remain 
dedicated to them despite the cost.  Unmanned systems funding is 
less than 1% of total DoD funding, despite insistence that unmanned 
systems development is a priority. 
 U.S. government policies, such as export controls and airspace 
restrictions, hinder civilian market growth critical to advancing the state 
of the art.  Other nations do not face this level of restrictions and will 
take advantage of this to close the technological gap.  The advantages 
enjoyed by the U.S. in focused development will be diminished as 
combat operations wind down.   
 The DoD should make no determined effort at industry consolidation or 
narrowing down on few designs.  Narrowing down too early in an 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 99 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
immature industry could result in fielding obsolete technology.  The fact 
that over 50% of total unmanned systems funding will be going to only 
three UAV programs should raise red flags to those concerned about 
competition and innovation. 
 Once key developments are made in autonomy and other areas, 
unmanned systems will be more cost effective than manned systems 
performing similar missions and will reduce unnecessary risks to U.S. 
personnel.  These developments require more resources now, but will 
result in greater long-run cost savings as advanced technologies 
minimize O&M requirements.  The most difficult cost to quantify is the 
value of the human lives spared by these technologies.     
 Although some development redundancy has occurred by competing 
firms with DoD contracts, this should not be viewed as wasting 
resources.  The importance of building a sound technological base 
cannot be overstated.  
 Unmanned systems are uniquely poised to take advantage of 
streamlined acquisition processes that are greatly desired in the push 
for acquisition reform. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close, the DoD will inevitably 
focus on unmanned systems consolidation.  While more unmanned systems variants 
mean more experimentation, there are training, operations, and maintenance costs 
associated with each variant.  Further research could focus on identifying the costs 
associated with maintaining multiple unmanned variants.  
Although the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (FY2013–2038 
Unmanned Systems, 2013) identified unmanned ground systems as a priority, the 
funding for such systems is a small fraction of total unmanned systems funding.  I 
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APPENDIX A. TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL DEFINITIONS 
Technology Readiness Level Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting 
Information (ASD[R&E], 2011) 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported: Transition from scientific research 
to applied research. Essential characteristics and behaviors of systems and 
architectures. Descriptive tools are mathematical formulations or algorithms. 
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated: Applied research. 
Theory and scientific principles are focused on specific application area to define the 
concept. Characteristics of the application are described. Analytical tools are 
developed for simulation or analysis of the application. 
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-
of concept: Proof of concept validation. Active Research and Development (R&D) is 
initiated with analytical and laboratory studies. Demonstration of technical feasibility 
using breadboard or brassboard implementations that are exercised with 
representative data. 
TRL 4 Component/subsystem validation in laboratory environment: Standalone 
prototyping implementation and test. Integration of technology elements. 
Experiments with full-scale problems or data sets. 
TRL 5 System/subsystem/component validation in relevant environment: 
Thorough testing of prototyping in representative environment. Basic technology 
elements integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements. Prototyping 
implementations conform to target environment and interfaces. 
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototyping demonstration in a relevant 
end-to-end environment (ground or space): Prototyping implementations on full-
scale realistic problems. Partially integrated with existing systems. Limited 
documentation available. Engineering feasibility fully demonstrated in actual system 
application. 
TRL 7 System prototyping demonstration in an operational environment 
(ground or space): System prototyping demonstration in operational environment. 
System is at or near scale of the operational system, with most functions available 
for demonstration and test. Well integrated with collateral and ancillary systems. 
Limited documentation available. 
TRL 8 Actual system completed and “mission qualified” through test and 
demonstration in an operational environment (ground or space): End of system 
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development. Fully integrated with operational hardware and software systems. 
Most user documentation, training documentation, and maintenance documentation 
completed. All functionality tested in simulated and operational scenarios. 
Verification and Validation (V&V) completed. 
TRL 9 Actual system “mission proven” through successful mission operations 
(ground or space): Fully integrated with operational hardware/software systems. 
Actual system has been thoroughly demonstrated and tested in its operational 
environment. All documentation completed. Successful operational experience. 
Sustaining engineering support in place.  
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APPENDIX B. 2013 UNMANNED SYSTEM PRIME 
CONTRACTORS 
2013 DoD Unmanned Systems Prime Contractors (OSD, 2013) 
2013 Unmanned Systems Prime Contractors 
Company Unmanned Systems 
AAI Corporation RQ-7B Shadow 
AeroVironment RQ-20A SUAS (Puma), RQ-11B Raven B, Wasp  
Applied Geo Technologies MARCbot IV N 
Applied Research Associates -Vertek Division All-Purpose Remote Transport System (ARTS) 
Applied Research Laboratory, Penn State 
University 
Sea Maverick, Sea Stalker 
Boeing ScanEagle, Echo Ranger 
Bluefin Robotics 
Hull Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Localization System 
(HULS) 
Caterpillar Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE) 
DOK-ING M-160  
Foster-Miller MK 2 MOD 0 Robot EOD  
General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle, MQ-1B Predator, MQ-9A Reaper 
General Dynamics Advanced Information 
Systems 
Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (SMCM UUV) 
General Dynamics Robotics Systems 
Antisubmarine Warfare Unmanned Surface Vehicle (ASW 
USV) 
Harborwing Autonomous Unmanned Surface Vehicle (AUSV) 
Honeywell International RQ-16B T-Hawk 
Hydrema Mine Area Clearance Equipment (MACE) 
Hydroid MK 18 MOD 2 Kingfish, MK 18 MOD 1 Swordfish 
Insitu Incorporated RQ-21A STUAS 
iRobot Mini EOD, MK 1 MOD 0 Robot EOD, PackBot 510  
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L-3 Unmanned Systems Viking 400  
Lockheed Martin 
Persistent Threat Detection System, Marlin, Remote 
Minehunting System (RMS), RQ-170 Sentinel  
Northwind Marine SEAFOX 
NSWCCD & NSWC PC MUSCL 
Northrop Grumman 
MQ-8B VTUAV (Fire Scout), MQ-5B Hunter, MQ-4C 
Triton, RQ-4B Global Hawk, Long Endurance Multi-
Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV), MK 3 MOD 0 Remote 
Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS), F6A ANDROS, 
HD-1, X-47B UCAV 
Oregon Iron Works 
Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
(MCM USV) 
PFM Manufacturing Defender, Fire Robotics Platform 
QinetiQ (Foster-Miller) TALON IIIB, TALON IV  
Raytheon 
Joint Land Attack Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS) 
Recon Robotics Recon Scout XT 
Segway Immediate Visualization and Neutralization (IVAN) 
SSC Pacific (with multiple vendors) ISR Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) 
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